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An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the 
United States Courts of Appeals: The Price 
of Reform* 
William L. Reynoldst 
William M. Richmantt 
In recent years, the caseload of the federal appellate courts 
has grown alarmingly in both the number of filings and the com-
plexity of the issues presented for decision. In an effort to cope 
with the pressures created by those increases, the courts have mod-
ified the manner in which they process cases in a number of ways. 
Some changes, such as prehearing settlement conferences, 1 have 
relatively little impact on the nature of the judicial process. The 
effect of others, such as reduction in oral argument,2 is more signif-
icant, for they alter the traditional method of judging appeals in 
ways that may substantially reduce the quality of appellate justice. 
One of the most dramatic of the recent innovations is the 
adoption by many courts of rules that determine which opinions 
should be released for publication. 8 In establishing criteria for pub-
* This study was sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, Contract No. 9504-610-
17092-13. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the Center. 
We wish to thank a number of persons for their assistance in this project. Alan Chaset 
and Pat Lombard of the Federal Judicial Center and David Gentry of the Administrative 
Office provided us with data and the background to understand it. Toni Sommers of the 
University of Toledo provided invaluable assistance with statistical computation. David 
Aemmer of the Ohio Bar, Lawrence Haislip of the Maryland Bar, and Susan Roesler, Uni-
versity of Toledo College of Law class of 1982, provided research assistance. All unpublished 
opinions discussed in this article are on ffie with The University of Chicago Law Review. 
t Professor of Law, University of Maryland. 
tt Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo. 
1 See, e.g., Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appel-
late Procedural Reform, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1209 (1978); Note, The Minnesota Supreme 
Court Prehearing Conference-An Empirical Evaluation, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1221 (1979). 
2 See generally 2 ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, 
at 2-32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE JUSTICE]. 
a This article discusses publication only in the United States Courts of Appeals. Many 
state courts also have adopted positions concerning unpublished opinions, sometimes arous-
ing a good deal of controversy. See generally Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: 
Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386 (1973)o Newbern & Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and 
the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REv. 37 (1978). 
On the question of publication generally, see P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADoR & M. RosEN-
BERG, JUSTICE ON .APPEAL 31-41 (1976); Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of 
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lication the courts have been truly innovative; in spite of the piv-
otal role of the published judicial opinion in the development of 
American common law, the selection of cases for publication has 
rarely been the subject of publicly delineated criteria. The recent 
formal decisions not to publish large numbers of opinions have 
aroused concern that the quality of the work produced by the 
courts will be adversely affected. That concern has in turn led to 
considerable discussion of the merits and demerits of a formally 
organized regime of limited publication." Although the discussion 
has been rich in theory, it has been relatively poor in data.5 
This article attempts to fill that gap. It presents an empirical 
assessment of the workings of the publication plans of the eleven 
United States Courts of Appeals during the 1978-79 Reporting 
Year. This is the first system-wide analysis of these publication 
plans and their effect on judicial productivity and responsibility. 
The article begins with a review of the background of publication 
plans. Then, after noting the methods used in the study, we ana-
lyze the relation between the language of the plans and the publi-
cation rates of the several circuits. Next comes an empirical assess-
ment of the costs and benefits of limited publication. Finally, we 
propose a Model Rule for publication, designed to realize the bene-
fits of limited publication while avoiding some of its hazards. 
Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts, 67 LAw Lm. J. 362 (1974); Joiner, Limit-
ing Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195 (1972). 
• The authors of this article have written on limited publication in two other places: 
Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Ci-
tation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Non-Precedential Precedent]; Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DuKE L.J. 807 [hereinafter cited as Limited 
Publication]. 
A bibliography on publication in federal appellate courts would also include the follow-
ing: Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate Court System 
(2d phase 1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished 
Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A.J. 1224 (1975); Note, Unreported Decisions in 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CoRNELL L. REV. 128 (1977); Comment, A Snake 
in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 
309 (1977). 
• There have been several publications that, while not empirical, are at least anecdotal. 
They review the unpublished opinions of a particular court and argue that some or many of 
them should have been published. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 4. 
Limited Publication, supra note 4, is an empirical study but it is limited in scope, covering 
only two circuits and decisions over roughly three months. See also Remarks of John P. 
Frank, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 29, 1976) (unpublished study of 50 unpub-
lished opinions) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Perspective on Publication 
In order to appreciate the importance of the limited publica-
tion debate, it is necessary to understand both the role of publica-
tion in American law, and past publication practice. The reasoned, 
published appellate opinion is the centerpiece of the American ju-
diciary's work. The reasons for that prominence are not hard to 
understand, for they inhere in the role of appellate judges in a sys-
tem of common law. 
The rule of precedent is fundamental to the common law. 6 In 
order to ensure consistency, judges explain why they decided as 
they did and why apparently similar cases were not thought to be 
controlling. Because opinions make law, these explanations must 
be readily accessible to interested persons. Their public availability 
is necessary to guide both the persons who may be affected by the 
law, and the judges who will apply that law to future disputes. The 
opinions of appellate courts naturally have special significance be-
cause of their position in the judicial hierarchy, and because the 
workload of nisi prius courts has made it increasingly difficult for 
them to issue polished opinions that contribute to the growth of 
the law. 
Against this background, it is surprising that the expectation 
of a reasoned and published decision is a relatively recent one. 
Viewed in historical perspective, limited publication is hardly a 
radical idea; until recently, case reporting has been a haphazard 
enterprise. English cases have been officially reported only since 
1865,7 following a long history of selective reporting by legal entre-
preneurs.8 Similarly, American reporting, virtually unknown until 
• The propositions in this paragraph should, of course, be familiar to every American 
lawyer. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (tent. ed. 1958); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. 
L. REv. 457 (1897); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. 
L. REv. 2 (1959). One of the authors of this article has set forth his views on the subject in 
more detail in W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL (1980). 
7 See generally R. WALKER & M. WALKER, THE ENGLISH"LEGAL SYSTEM 139-41 (4th ed. 
1976), which criticizes the entire reporting system for its "informality." Official English re-
porting today produces the Law Reports under the aegis of the Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting for England and Wales. There also are unofficial reporters, the most familiar of 
which is the All England Law Reports. 
• The first English reports are the Year Books, which began, perhaps as a kind of early 
legal newspaper, in the reign of Edward I. See T. PLUCKNE'IT, A CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAw 269 (5th ed. 1956). Private reporting developed with the end of the Year 
Books in 1537. The quality of the private reports varied greatly. Holdsworth called Sir 
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the start of the nineteenth century,9 was long the province of pri-
vate venturers. Indeed, private reporting continued in at least 
some federal courts until well after the Civil War.10 These publica-
tions only gradually came to reflect an appreciation shared by 
judge and reporter concerning the form and content of the re-
port.U Today, of course, legal reporting is dominated by the West 
James Burrow (1701-1782) the "connecting link" between "old" and modern reporting be-
cause Burrow strove for completeness and accuracy. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW 110-12, 116 (1938). 
9 Apparently there is no general work on the histocy of publication in the United 
States. Ephraim Kirby's 1789 volume of Connecticut Reports was the first reporter pub-
lished in this countcy, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 282 (1973), although 
modern historians have unearthed and published reports of colonial cases. See, e.g., D. 
BOORSTIN, DELAWARE CASES 1792-1830 (1943); PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF AP-
PEALS 1695-1729 (C. Bond ed. 1933). Hence the comment, "Historians actually know more 
about colonial case law today than could have been widely known in colonial America." 
Johnson, John Jay: Lawyer in a Time of Transition, 1764-1775, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1260, 
1264 n.17 (1976). Another example of early publication is found in Maryland, where a court 
reporter and a young attorney began publishing colonial Maryland cases as a private ven-
ture in 1809. See C. BoND, THE CoURTS OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY 111 (1928). In 
contrast, publication in Massachusetts began with authorization from the legislature in 
1804. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE CoMMON LAw 168 (1975). Publication of New 
York cases began in 1794. Johnson, supra, at 1264 n.17. 
Publication of Supreme Court opinions did not begin until the second volume of Dal-
las's Reports was published in 1798. Even then progress lagged; although the third volume 
appeared in 1799, the fourth was held up until1807. Other sources for Supreme Court work, 
such as newspapers, apparently were unsatisfactocy. See J. GoEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BE-
GINNINGS TO 1801, at 664-65 (Histocy of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 1, 
1971). 
10 Samuel Blatchford, both district and circuit judge before joining the Supreme Court, 
reported Second Circuit decisions until 1887 when the Federal Reporter, begun several 
years earlier, put him out of business. See M. ScHICK, LEARNED HAND's CoURT 44 (1970). 
11 When Roger Taney became Chief Justice, for example, 
[t]here was widespread disagreement •.. as to the subject matter to be included in the 
reports . . . . The question was much discussed in law journals. • . . Reviewers varied 
all the way from those who wanted to save money for la\vyers by limiting publication to 
selected opinions, to those who advocated publication of all opinions together with ar-
guments of counsel and other relevant documents. 
C. SwiSHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1835-64, at 296 (Histocy of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, vol. 4, 1974). 
Standards were quite lax, even for Supreme Court reporting. Errors abounded, and 
sometimes the reporter failed to include dissenting opinions. Id. at 300-02. Justice Stacy 
found it commendable that reporters corrected grammatical and typographical errors. See 
id. at 299-300. Benjamin Howard, in the first volume of his Reports (1843), "resorted to 
what seemed an amazing example of bad taste by advertising his availability for the argu-
ment of cases." Id. at 308. 
Uneven reporting required that both state and federal reports be regularly reviewed in 
the law reviews for quality and coverage. See, e.g., 8 AM. L.J. 273 (1848) (New Jersey); 1 AM. 
L. REG. 60 (1853) (Second Circuit). 
Full and accurate reporting depended upon the development of a tradition of full and 
complete judicial explication of the decision. This is a relatively recent development. Lord 
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Publishing Company. It routinely publishes all opinions sent to it 
by the circuit judges in accordance with their respective publica-
tion plans.12 
Limited publication, then, is not new. What is new and radical 
is the notion that the judges themselves should be controlling ac-
cess to their work by means of systematic publication plans. The 
publication plans of the federal courts of appeals collectively re-
present the most ambitious systematic effort to reconcile the con-
flict between the costs and benefits of full publication. 
B. The History of the Circuit Plans 
The movement toward the present circuit court publication 
plans began in 1964, when the Judicial Conference of the United 
States recommended that the federal courts authorize "the publi-
cation of only those opinions which are of general precedential 
value."13 Eight years later,u the Board of the Federal Judicial 
Center proposed that each Circuit Council establish plans that 
Coke advised that "wise and learned men do before they judge labour to reach to the depth 
of all the reasons of the case in question, but in their judgments express not any." 3 Co. 
Rep. v (J. Thomas ed., London 1826). 
A look through state reports around 1800 reveals what to the modem reader is a star-
tling lack of explication among courts of last resort. In Maryland, for example, the Court of 
Appeals often decided cases without an opinion until a statute requiring them was enacted 
in 1832. Lower courts were more prone to give reasons in order that their decisions could be 
properly reviewed on appeal. C. BoND, supra note 9, at 139-40. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, a number of states had imposed, either 
through their constitutions or by statute, a requirement that appellate decisions be rendered 
in a written opinion. See Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 
486 (1930). That such development might not be wholly salutary was foreseen by Jonathan 
Swift: 
It is a maximum [sic] among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before 
may legally be done again; and therefore they take special care to record all the deci-
sions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind. These, 
under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to justify the most iniqui-
tous opinions; and the judges never fail of directing accordingly. 
J. SwiFT, GULLIVER's TRAVELS 283 (Modem Library ed. 1931) (1st ed. London 1726). 
11 West publishes only opinions designated for publication by the several circuits. Let-
ter to authors from James P. Corson, Managing Editor, West Publishing Co. (May 23, 1980) 
(on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). Several federal courts (e.g., the Tax 
Court, the Court of Military Appeals) have their own reporter; the Courts of Appeals do not. 
Unpublished opinions may be "published" in other sources, such as specialty reporters, 
or placed in the memory of a computerized legal research system such as LEXIS, see text 
and note at note 30 infra. 
Ia [1964] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 11. 
" Some of the circuits, in the meantime, had made some pronouncements in case law 
on the problem of unlimited publication. E.g., Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 
F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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would limit publication and forbid citation of unpublished opin-
ions.15 Later that year, the Judicial Conference endorsed the 
Center,s proposal and directed each circuit to devise a publication 
plan.16 In 1974, the Center published a Model Rule for publica-
tion, 17 a proposal that has been the model for the publication plans 
of a number of circuits. Meanwhile, the circuits, responding to the 
Judicial Conference directive, had each sent a proposed publica-
tion plan to the Conference. The Conference applauded the diver-
sity of these plans, for it meant that there would be "11 legal labo-
ratories accumulating experience and amending their publication 
plans on the basis of that experience/,1s Little has changed since 
15 BOARD OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE 
APRIL 1972 SESSION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE PUBLICATION 
OF CouRTS OF APPEALS OPINIONS (1972). The various groups mentioned in the text are de-
scribed in more detail in Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1170-71 & nn. 18, 
25, 26. 
18 [1972] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 33. 
17 ADVISORY CouNciL FOR APPELLATE JusTICE, FJC RESEARCH SERIES No. 73-2, STAN-
DARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1973) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]. The 
development of these Standards is discussed in more detail in Non-Precedential Precedent, 
supra note 4, at 1170-71 & n.25. The Model Rule provides: 
1. Standard for Publication 
An opinion of the (highest court) or of the (intermediate court) shall not be desig-
nated for publication unless: 
a. The opinion establishes a new rule of law or alters or modifies an existing rule; 
or 
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or 
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or 
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority. 
2. Opinions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges partici-
pating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in section (1) of 
this rule is satisfied. Concurring opinions shall be published only if the majority opin-
ion is published. Dissenting opinions may be published if the dissenting judge deter-
mines that a standard for publication as set out in section (1) of this rule is satisfied. 
The (highest court) may order any unpublished opinion of the (intermediate court) or 
a concurring or dissenting opinion in that court published. 
3. If the standard of publication as set out in section (1) of the rule is satisfied as to 
only a part of an opinion, only that part shall be published. 
4. The judges who decide the case shall consider the question of whether or not to 
publish an opinion in the case at the conference on the case before or at the time the 
writing assignment is made, and at that time, if appropriate, they shall make a tenta-
tive decision not to publish. 
5. All opinions that are not found to satisfy a standard for publication as prescribed 
by section (1) of this rule shall be marked, Not Designated for Publication. Opinions 
marked, Not Designated for Publication, shall not be cited as precedent by any court 
or in any brief or other· materials presented to any court. 
18 [1974] JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 12. While the Judicial 
Conference studied publication, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate 
System (chaired by Senator Hruska) also looked at the problem. Although the Hruska Com-
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1974. Although the Judicial Conference left the circuits' publica-
tion plans in a state of experimentation, there has been little effort 
to assess the results of those experiments either by scholars19 or 
the federal judicial establishment.20 
C. The Pros and Cons of Limited Publication 
The justification for limited publication rests on three prem-
ises: first, there is no need to publish all opinions; second, full pub-
lication is costly; and third, judges can effectively determine when 
an opinion need be published. Each of those premises can be dis-
puted. In addition, several distinct counterarguments can be ad-
vanced against limited publication. 21 
1. Dispute Settling and Lawmaking. Common law opinions 
have two functions: they settle disputes among litigants and, in do-
ing so, sometimes make law.22 Not all opinions, even at the appel-
late level, make law. Opinions may only reaffirm well-settled prin-
ciples. These, the argument runs, need not be published, for 
society has no real interest in them. Such decisions are important 
to the litigants, but not to anyone else. 
This argument is flawed by its reliance on a view of judicial 
lawmaking as the statement of mechanical rules rather than prin-
ciples extracted from the decisions of cases read in their factual 
context. When judicial lawmaking is viewed in that light, it can be 
seen that all decisions make law, or at least contribute to the pro-
cess, for each shows how courts actually resolve disputes. Applica-
mission recommended the adoption of limited publication and noncitation plans, the Com-
mission deferred to the Judicial Conference concerning details. CoMMISSION ON REVISION OF 
THE FEDERAL CoURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: REcoMMEN-
DATIONS FOR CHANGE 50-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA REPORT]. The testimony of 
judges, lawyers, and academics before the Commission provides valuable insight on the 
question of selective publication and noncitation. See Hearings, supra note 4. 
•• See text and notes at notes 3-5 supra. 
•• Indeed, even the useful Publication Plans Reports prepared by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts for the years 1973 through 1977 have been terminated, 
which suggests that the plans may have come to be considered permanent. The Publication 
Plans Reports were prepared for the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction of the Commit-
tee on Court Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Non-
Precedential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1173 n.34. As far as we know, these reports re-
present the only effort sponsored by the entire federal judicial establishment to evaluate the 
workings of the plans. The Ninth Circuit, however, did sponsor a limited study by John 
Frank of publication in that circuit. See Remarks of John P. Frank, supra note 5. 
•• More detailed discussion of the material in this section can be found in Non-Prece-
dential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1181-85, 1187-94, 1199-1204. 
•• See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 396-97. 
HeinOnline -- 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 580 1981
580 The University of Chicago Law Review [48:573 
tions of general principles in specific contexts clarify the scope of 
the principles. At the same time, such applications demonstrate 
whether the principles are actually followed by judges in routine 
cases or are simply "paper rules," useful mainly for display. The 
unavailability of decisions thus reduces our ability to understand 
the principles relied on by the court. 
2. The High Cost of Full Publication. ·The second premise of 
the argument for limited publication asserts that excessive costs 
are associated with full publication. Those costs fall into two cate-
gories, one linked to·the preparation of an opinion, the other to its 
consumption. 
Preparing opinions is a large part of a judge's workload. More 
time must be spent if the opinion will be published-to allow more 
proofreading and prose polishing, for example. More effort also is 
required to ensure that the opinion contains no loose language that 
can return to haunt the court in a later case. Eliminating these 
costs can help judges cope more effectively with heavy workloads 
with little or no diminution in the quality of justice dispensed. Or 
so the argument goes. Although the idea seems plausible it has 
never been verified empirically.sa 
The second part of the excessive cost argument focuses on the . 
cost of full publication to the consumers of opinions. To American 
lawyers this is a familiar problem. "The endless search for factual 
analogy"2' runs up the bill of the conscientious attorney with little 
or no gain in the refinement of legal principles. Law libraries and 
their budgets are straiiled to the breaking point and beyond. The 
bar looks with envy upon England, where the reported case law 
fills but a few volumes a year.u These are real concerns, yet it 
must be remembered that even cumulative opinions have value. 
They can suggest how firm a line of precedent may be, for exam-
ple, or indicate problems in the application of articulated prece-
dent, or even show the divergence of a rule from the expectations 
of those to whom it is addressed. Thus, value can be found in pub-
lishing any opinion; the real question is whether the associated 
costs are too high. 
•s We know of only one effort to do so, and it is unreliable. See Non-Precedential Pre-
cedent, supra note 4, at 1183 n.95 (discussion of a study of time allocation in the Third 
Circuit); cf. text and notes at notes 59-67 infra (finding that evidence is at best inconclusive 
as to increased productivity). 
•• STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 17. 
•• In 1979, for example, the All England Reports comprised three volumes. 
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3. The Early Decision Not to Publish. Many of the cost sav-
ings associated with limited publication would be lost if judges 
made the decision not to publish only after the opinion had al-
ready been polished and made ready for public consumption. An 
early decision not to publish entails significant costs, however, for 
value inheres in the actual writing of the opinion. For many au-
thors, writing about a subject helps them to develop their thought 
on the topic. Furthermore, if an opinion in support of a decision 
simply "will not write," the conscientious judge is forced to recon-
sider the decision. 26 The danger here is that the decision not to 
publish will affect the reasoning or even the result. 
Another major problem with an early decision not to publish 
centers on the ability of a court to predict, early in the judicial 
process, that its opinion will not make law. The ability of judges to 
do so is by no means self-evident. If the prediction process is im-
perfect, the legal community will have lost access to opinions it 
should see. 
4. Further Arguments Against Nonpublication. Limited 
publication can be attacked even if the above premises prove true. 
First, limited publication reduces judicial responsibility by remov-
ing the constraints that stare decisis places upon the court. The 
concept of precedent cautions as well as governs. If an opinion is 
not to be published, unwise things may be said without fear that 
the corpus juris will be adversely affected. Judicial responsibility 
also may be diminished if courts use the nonpublication list as a 
respository for troublesome cases presenting issues the court does 
not wish to address in public. Again, nonpublication may permit 
judg~s to approach their jobs more routinely, without the real 
thought and effort that precedential decision making requires. The 
final counterargument to limited publication recognizes the role 
played by the availability of opinions in holding judges account-
able for their actions. If "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants,"27 then limited publication may permit sores to fester. 
5. A Word on Citation Practices. As part of their approach 
to limited publication, seven of the circuits prohibit citation to an 
unpublished opinion, and an eighth discourages the practice; only 
three circuits permit free citation of such opinions.28 The prohibi-
•• Hearings, supra note 4, at 735 (testimony of Professor Terrance Sandalow). See also 
note 151 infra. 
07 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEoPLE's MoNEY 92 (1914). 
•• The seven rules prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions are D.C. Cm. R. S(f}; 
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tion of citation is part and parcel of the limited publication ap-
proach, for without such rules its goals could easily be frustrated. 
If citation were freely permitted, both litigants and judges would 
be unable to realize the potential time savings from not having to 
read unpublished opinions.29 In addition, the prohibition on cita-
tion is necessary to prevent unfairness arising from the ability of 
well-heeled litigants to monitor, store, and use unpublished opin-
ions more readily than other litigants. so 
The perception in seven circuits that a noncitation rule is a 
necessary aspect of a limited publication plan therefore seems sub-
stantially accurate. We have doubts, however, about the efficacy of 
noncitation rules. The hidden problem is whether the judges and 
their staffs adhere to the rule. We have found few opinions refer-
ring to unpublished opinions, indicating at least facial compliance 
with the noncitation rule. Still, some uneasiness persists, based on 
the intuition that not everyone who is aware of how cases have 
been decided will refrain from using that knowledge in later litiga-
tion. Our concern centers on pro se civil rights and habeas corpus 
cases. To the judges and clerks who handle those appeals, reliance 
on unpublished decisions-"non-precedential precedents"s1 
-must be inevitable. The caseload is large, and there is often a 
previous decision squarely on point that provides a tempting re-
search tool. Yet many of these cases are frivolous and hence go 
1sT Cm. R. 14; 2D Cm. R. 0.23; 6TH Cm. R. 11; 7TH Cm. R. 35(b)(2)(iv); 8TH Cm. R. app.; 9TH 
Cm. R. 21(e). Neither the Third nor the Fifth Circuit addresses the citation issue. Only the 
Tenth affirmatively permits citation, lOTH Cm. R. 17(c); opposing parties must be served 
with a copy of any unpublished opinions that will be used. The Fourth Circuit permits but 
discourages citation. 4TH Cm. R. 18(d)(ii)-(ili). 
•• See Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1186-87. This is especially true 
given the publication of "unpublished" opinions in unofficial specialty reporters and the 
recently developed computer systems such as LEXIS, making th!lm available for general use 
if citation is permitted. 
•• I d. at 1187. The ability" of courts to control circulation of unpublished opinions has 
been greatly diminished by the advent of computer-assisted legal research. Although the 
LEXIS memory bank purportedly contains only "publishable" opinions, see letter from 
Buzz Reed, ¥ead Data Central (Apr. 25, 1981) (on file with The University of Chicago Law 
Review), several of the unpublished opinions discussed in this article are available on the 
system. See, e.g., Burrison v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 78-7536 [603 F.2d 211] (2d 
Cir. Mar. 29, 1979); Moorer v. G.riffin, No. 77-3580 [586 F.2d 844] (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1978); 
United States v. Vera, ~o. 77-5363 [582 F.2d 1281] (6th Cir. July 10, 1978). All of these 
cases appear in the Federal Reporter (2d), but only as parts of tables of unpublished opin-
ions. These opinions are available only to those able to pay for the service. Such limited 
circulation exacerbates the problem of unequal access. 
31 The phrase comes from Judge Robert Sprecher's testimony before the Hruska Com-
mission. Hearings, supra note 4, at 537. 
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unpublished. 32 The result may be reliance on a substantial research 
library or "issues file" that is unavailable to the litigants. as 
D. A Necessary Note on Workload 
The following sections analyze various problems associated 
with limited publication plans. Reflection upon those issues must 
include consideration of the difficulties that led the courts to adopt 
the publication plans: the increases in the volume and complexity 
of the work of the federal courts. 
Apocalyptic commentaries on the workload of the United 
States Courts of Appeals are not hard to find." Their very famili-
arity may rob them of some of their impact. Examination of the 
product of the circuit courts over even a short period lends some 
perspective, dramatically bringing home the overload. 
This study covered the year ending June 30, 1979. In that 
time, the eleven circuits terminated 12,419 cases following judicial 
action. 315 During that period there were 97 circuit judges. 36 On aver-
age, each of those judges decided about 1.2 cases per working 
day.37 For each vote a participating judge must have done ·some 
.. See text at note 148 infra for the tendency to permit a disproportionate number of 
opinions in such cases to go unpublished. 
ss Hearings, supra note 4, at 537 (testimony of Judge Sprecher). 
,. A sample of these alarming recitations can be found in NLRB v. Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970); HRusKA REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; Ha-
worth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 
WASH. U.L.Q. 257 • 
.. That figure is obtained from statistical data supplied by the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts (Sept. 24, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Re-
view) [hereinafter cited as Statistical Data], by adding the totals from Tables 1P (total 
published opinions) and 5U (total unpublished opinions). See note 45 infra for explanation 
of the term "with judicial action." The total number here does not include consolidations, 
i.e., cases that have separate docket numbers but are briefed, argued, or decided with other 
cases in one proceeding. Including consolidations the total is 15,053. (Consolidations esti-
mated as 17.5% of the total number of cases terminated, in accord with ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1979 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 51 [hereinaf-
ter cited as ANNuAL REPoRT).) 
•• The actual number of authorized judgeships in the United States Circuit Courts was 
132, but 35 judgeships were unfilled. See ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 44. 
01 The 1.2 figure was computed as follows: Because circuit judges typically sit in panels 
of three, in order to determine the total number of judicial votes cast to decide the 12,419 
cases, that figure must be multiplied by three; thus there were 37,257 votes cast during the 
fiscal year. Of those votes, 77.8% were cast by active circuit judges (the others were cast by 
visiting and by senior circuit judges, see id. at 50), a total of 28,986. Assuming 250 working 
days for each of the 97 active circuit judges, the total number of "judge-days" in fiscal1978-
79 was 24,250. Simple division then shows that the average active circuit judge decided al-
most ·1.2 cases per day. (It should be noted that in some proceedings, motions to reduce or 
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reading and research. 38 If all he read were the briefs, staff memo-
randa, and record in each case, his workdays would be full. In ad-
dition, the judge must draft opinions for publication, read the 
drafts of other judges' opinions, participate in conference, and hear 
arguments. Each judge must try to keep current on developments 
in the law, run his staff, help administer his circuit, perhaps serve 
on professional committees, and so on. 
The point of this fairly dreary exposition is that the object of 
this article is not to criticize the judges. Their dedication and in-
dustry is beyond question. We aim only to examine and evaluate 
one technique that judges have used to streamline their workload. 
The next three parts of the article report the empirical study. 
We begin with a description of the methodology used in the study. 
We then examine the relation between publication frequency and 
the content of the several publication plans. Finally, we discuss the 
costs and benefits associated with limited publication: What do the 
judges gain from nonpublication? Are there any drawbacks associ-
ated with those gains? Are there ways to minimize the costs while 
realizing most of the gains? 
II. THE STUDY: METHODOLOGY 
Our assessment of the impact of the publication plans on the 
decision-making process of the courts of appeals is based on a 
study of the published and unpublished opinions of those courts 
during the 1978-79 Reporting Year.39 Reviewing the material pub-
grant bail, for example, circuit judges may act singly. This means the average stated above· 
is somewhat high.) 
Average figures, of course, conceal peaks and valleys among the circuits. In the Fourth 
Circuit, for instance, 1236 cases were decided by judicial action. Multiplication by three 
yields a total of 3708 votes. Reducing that figure by 20% for votes cast by senior and visit-
ing judges yields 2966. Seven active judges provided 1750 judge-days over the assumed 250 
working days, and thus nearly 1.7 decisions per day for each ac;tive circuit judge. 
In the District of Columbia Circuit, by contrast, the number of cases decided after judi-
cial action was 699, producing 2097 total votes. This figure must be reduced by 20.7% to 
account for the contribution of visiting and senior judges. The result of that reduction, 1663, 
when divided by 2250 total judge-days {9 judges times 250 working days) yields nearly .74 
decisions per judge per day. Percentages of votes cast by active circuit judges are from id. at 
51. Cases decided per circuit is computed from Statistical Data, supra note 35, Tables 1P, 
5U. 
38 Some cases naturally present fewer problema than others; many are frivolous. For a 
conscientious judge, however, even those present demands on his time. The judge who 
wishes to supervise even minimally the work of the staff attorneys and his own law clerks 
must spend some time on even the most frivolous appeal. 
3
" The Reporting Year ran from July 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979. For the statistics 
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lished during that period was relatively straightforward; we used 
all appeal-dispositive documents-"opinions"40-found in the Fed-
eral Reporter (2d) for that year.41 Choosing the unpublished mate-
rial involved somewhat more selectivity because the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts (the administrative and 
record-keeping agency of the federal judiciary) distinguishes be-
tween appeals terminated "by judicial action" and those termi-
nated "without judicial action. "41 We studied only the former 
group, because we did not want to include consent decrees, affir-
mances or reversals by stipulation, or out-of-court settlements.48 
Those types of dispositions present only bookkeeping problems to 
the judges, and do not require any real exercise of judicial ability; 
their inclusion in the study, therefore, would obscure the nature of 
what judges in fact do. Accordingly, the total population for this 
study included all terminations that were published,44 and all un-
published terminations that were by "judicial action. "4G Table 1 
records the population of published and unpublished opinions used 
in the study. 
kept by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for that period, see ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 35, at A-1 to -175. 
•• "Opinion" is a generic term. The several circuits refer to their written products by 
many different (and at times inconsistent) labels. Included in the term "opinion" for our 
purposes are what some circuits would call opinions, memoranda, per curiam opinions, or-
ders, judgments, and judgment orders. 
•• A list of "Appeals Terminations" was furnished us by the Administrative Office. All 
information compiled by the Office and, in turn, all the information that we used in the 
study was compiled from records kept by the individual circuit court clerks on a form 
known as "J.S. 34 Appeals Disposition-Termination Form" (on file with The University of 
Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as J.S. 34]. In order to generate the list of published 
appeals terminations, we selected all terminations whose J.S. 34 forms contained checks in 
positions 1, 2, or 3 in box 13 ("Opinion"). 
•• See the J:s. 34 form, boxes 9 and 10 (termination ·by judicial action), and box 11 
(termination without judicial action). 
41 Nevertheless, we found a fair number of decisions labeled "judicial action" that were, 
in fact, voluntary dismissals and the like. 
« A total of 4737 terminations were published. Thirty-eight terminated appeals were 
recorded as "published" but as not involving "judicial action"; we therefore excluded them 
from the study for reasons explained in text and note at note 43 supra. These inconsistent 
designations probably were the result of a reporting error. In any case, their number is 
insignificant. 
•• This procedure differs from the Administrative Office's typical record-keeping habits 
in one important respect. For many purposes (e.g., recording reversal rates and separate 
opinion rates), the Office uses as its relevant total disposition population the set of appeals 
dispositions that occurred after oral hearing or submission upon the briefs. See, e.g., ANNUAL 
REPoRT, supra note 35, Table B1. For most of the same purposes, we chose the larger popu-
lation of appeals terminated "by judicial action." The difference between the two popula-
tions is that many cases docketed in the courts of appeals are terminated without argument 
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TABLE 1 
PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Circuit Published Unpublished Total 
D.C. 194 505 699 
First 214 147 361 
Second 359 563 922 
Third 219 991 1210 
Fourth 346 890 1236 
Fifth 1385 978 2363 
Sixth 340 908 1248 
Seventh 325 736 1061 
Eighth 448 209 657 
Ninth 618 1238 1856 
Tenth 251 555 806 
Total 4699 7720 12419 
SoURCE: Statistical Data, supra note 35, Tables lP, 5U. 
or submission upon written briefs. Some of these nevertheless are terminations "by judicial 
action." Examples are motions for summary affirmance, motions for stays, and motions for 
bail reductions. These cases typically involve some written argument to the court; however, 
they are not reported as "submitted upon written briefs" unless the "brier• is the formal 
brief contemplated in FED. R. APP. P. 28. Telephone conversation with David Gentry, Re-
search Analyst, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (July 24, 1980). We rea-
soned that the larger population of appeals terminated "by judicial action" was more appro-
priate for our study than the smaller set of appeals terminated "after argument or 
submission" because the larger group more closely reflects the total case-terminating work 
of the judges. 
In the course of our study, it became apparent that the total number of opinions indi-
cated as unpublished on the J.S. 34 forms compiled by the Administrative Office included 
a few opinions that actually were published. This could be the result either of errors by the 
circuit court clerk in filling out the J.S. 34 forms, or of reversals of original decisions not to 
publish. Because it was impractical for us to verify independently that each of the nearly 
8000 "unpublished" opinions on the list supplied by the Administrative Office was unpub-
lished, we did not correct for these factors. We have no reason to believe that excluding 
these opinions would significantly decrease the population size, particularly because coding 
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PUBLICATION PERFORMANCE 
587 
The fundamental empirical question concerning the publica-
tion plans46 is whether they have any effect at all on the decision to 
publish. Do the judges actually pay attention to the plans? Fortu-
nately for the analyst, both the contents of the publication plans 
and the extent to which publication is limited vary widely among 
the circuits. Differences occur along several lines-the specificity of 
publication criteria, the existence vel non of a presumption against 
publication, and the maker of the publication decision. 47 This sec-
tion examines the effect of those differences on the circuits' actual 
publication behavior. Table 2, which reports the percentage of 
published and unpublished opinions in each circuit, will facilitate 
that examination. 
TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE OF OPINIONS PUBLISHED 
Circuit Published (%) Unpublished(%) 
D.C. 27.8 72.2 
First 59.3 40.7 
Second 38.9 61.1 
Third 18.1 81.9 
Fourth 28.0 72.0 
Fifth 58.6 41.4 
Sixth 27.2 72.8 
Seventh 30.6 69.4 
Eighth 68.2 31.8 
Ninth 33.3 66.7 
Tenth 31.1 68.9 
Average 38.3 61.7 
SoURcE: Calculated from the data in Table 1 supra. 
error presumably would be randomly distributed, with approximately equal numbers of un-
published opinions coded as published and published opinions coded as unpublished. 
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A. Specificity. 
One aspect in which the plans vary widely is the specificity of 
the standards that guide the publication decision. Some plans es-
tablish criteria that can only be described as vague. The Third Cir-
cuit, for example, prescribes publication only where "the opinion 
has precedential or institutional value. ""8 Other circuits have spe-
cific publication criteria. The Ninth Circuit Plan, for example, pro-
vides for publication of an opinion that 
(1) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, 
or 
(2) Calls attention to a rule of law ~hich appears to 
have been generally overlooked, or 
(3) Criticizes existing law, or 
( 4) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or 
substantial public importance, or 
(5) Relies in whole or in part upon a reported opinion in 
the case by a district court or an administrative agency, or 
(6) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissent-
ing expression, and the author of such separate expression 
desires that it be reported or distributed to regular 
subscribers. 49 
•• All of the circuits have limited publication plans. In addition, all but one have local 
rules that address the question. A circuit's position on limited publication thus can be deter-
mined only by looking at both its plan and any relevant local rules. The following are the 
relevant rules: D.C. Cm. R. S(t); 1ST Cm. R. 14; 2D Cm. R. 0.23; 4TH Cm: R. 18; 5TH Cm. R. 
21; 6TH Cm. R. 11; 7TH Cm. R. 35; 8TH Cm. R. 14; 9TH Cm. R. 21; lOTH Cm. R. 17. In the 
Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the publication plan consists simply of 
the text of the rule. In the Third Circuit, there is no relevant local rule, but only a publica-
tion plan. In the other five circuits, the publication plan is distinct from the local rule on the 
question. In two circuits, the First and the Eighth, the publication plans appear as appendi-
ces to the circuit's. local rules. 
•• Earlier, we attempted to classify the publication plans of the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits as "conservative" and "radical," respectively. Those classifications were somewhat 
awkward, but they did permit consideration of these factors. We hypothesized that a radical 
plan would produce lower publication percentages than a conservative plan. The data did 
not support that hypothesis. See Limited Publication, supra note 4, at 810-14, for an expla-
nation of the terms • 
.. THIRD CIRCUIT PLAN (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). 
•• 9TH Cm. R. 21(b). 
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The circuits can be roughly divided into two groups depending on 
the specificity of their publication criteria. 50 Table 3 displays the 
circuits in that arrangement with the percentage of published and 
unpublished opinions produced by each circuit. The data show lit-
tle correlation between the degree of specificity of a circuit's publi-
cation criteria and its actual publication behavior. The average 
publication percentage for circuits with detailed standards was 
36.5% while the . average for circuits with vague standards was 
40.4%. On the other hand, the data in Table 3 may give dispropor-
Circuit 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Average 
Circuit 
D.C. 
Fourth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Tenth 
Average 
TABLE 3 
PUBLICATION RELATED TO SPECIFICITY OF STANDARDS 
PUBLICATION IN CIRCUITS WITH VAGUE STANDARDS 
Published (%) 
59.3 
38.9 
18.1 
58.6 
27.2 
40.4 
Unpublished(%) 
40.7 
61.1 
81.9 
41.4 
72.8 
59.6 
PUBLICATION IN CIRCUITS WITH SPECIFIC STANDARDS 
Published (%) Unpublished (%) 
27.8 72.2 
28.0 72.0 
30.6 69.4 
68.2 31.8 
33.3 66.7 
31.1 68.9 
36.5 63.5 
•• The circuits with "vague" standards, and the pertinent rules, are: 1sT Cm. R. app. B; 
2n CIR. R. 0.23; THnm CIRCUIT PLAN para. (a); 5TH Cm. R. 21; SIXTH CIRCUIT PLAN para. 2 
(on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). The "specific" rules are: DISTRICT OF 
CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. e (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); 4TH 
CIR. R. 18(a); 7TH Cm. R. 35(c)(l); 8TH Cm. R. app. para. 4; 9TH Cm. R. 2l(b); lOTH Cm. R. 
17(d), (e). 
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tionate effect to the publication habits of the Eighth Circuit. All of 
the other circuits with specific standards have publication percent-
ages in the high 20s or low 30s, or less than half the Eighth Cir-
cuit's publication percentage of 68.2%. If the Eighth Circuit is ex-
cluded, the average percent published for the circuits with specific 
standards would be 30.2%, and the percentage of opinions unpub-
lished would be 69.8%. These percentages would indicate that a 
substantially greater proportion of opinions are published in cir-
cuits with vague standards. Unless and until we discover some 
anomalous practice in the Eighth Circuit explaining the disparity, 
however, we do not feel justified in excluding the circuit from our 
computations. At any rate, we cannot be as confident as the results 
of Table 3 might warrant that specificity of standards has no effect 
on publication percentage. It may well be that vague standards en-
hance the likelihood of publication. 
B. Presumptions 
Another provision that might affect the tendency to publish is 
a presumption against publication. Some circuits make such a pre-
sumption explicit. The First Circuit Plan, for instance, provides 
that 
While we do not presently attempt to categqrize the crite-
ria which should determine publication, we are confident that 
a significantly larger proportion of cases will result in unpub-
lished decisions if the court adopts a policy of self conscious 
scrutiny of the publish-worthiness of each disposition coupled 
with a presumption, in the absence of justification, against 
publication. 51 
In other circuits the presumption is not explicit, but is inferable.152 
In still other circuits there is no presumption against publication. 
Commentators generally have favored publication plans with specific publication stan-
dards. The reason for that preference is not really the hope for lower published/nonpub-
lished ratios. Rather, the commentators have believed that vague criteria might be an insuf-
ficient guide and that precedential opinions might be lost through misclassification. See 
Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1177; Note, supra note 4, at 147. 
"' 1sT Cm. R. app. B(a). 
•• The Fourth Circuit, for example, before listing its publication standards provides 
that "an opinion shall not be published unless it meets one of the following standards for 
publication." 4TH Cm. R. 18(a). 
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A plausible hypothesis is that the circuits that have a pre-
sumption against publication (explicit or implicit)153 would publish 
less than circuits without such a presumption. Table 4 shows that 
circuits without presumptions against publication published 44.9% 
of their opinions, while circuits with such a presumption published 
only 32.7% of their opinions. The existence of a presumption 
against publication, then, does seem to affect actual publication 
practice.154 
TABLE 4 
PUBLICATION RELATED TO PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST PUBLICATION 
Circuit 
First 
Third 
Fourth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Ninth 
Average 
Circuit 
D.C. 
Second 
Fifth 
Eighth 
Tenth 
Average 
CIRCUITS WITH PRESUMPTION AGAINST PUBLICATION 
Published (%) 
59.3 
18.1 
28.0 
27.2 
30.6 
33.3 
32.7 
Unpublished (%) 
40.7 
81.9 
72.0 
72.8 
69.4 
66.7 
67.3 
CIRCUITS WITHOUT PRESUMPTION AGAINST PUBLICATION 
Published (%) Unpublished (%) 
27.8 72.2 
38.9 61.1 
58.6 41.4 
68.2 31.8 
31.1 68.9 
44.9 55.1 
•• Six Circuits have a presumption against publication. See 1sT Cm. R. app. B(a) (ex-
plicit); THIRD CIRCUIT PLAN paras. 1, 2 (with regard to per curiam opinions, but not with 
regard to signed opinions); 4TH Cm. R. 18(a) (implicit); SIXTH CIRCUIT PLAN para. 2 (ex-
plicit); 7TH Cm. R. 35(a) (explicit); 9TH Cm. R. 21(a), (b) (implicit). 
" There are, of course, other possible explanations for these variations. It should be 
noted that in general the circuits with presumptions against publication are larger than the 
circuits without such presumptions. (See the figures in Table 1 supra.) The size of the cir-
cuit and the accompanying administrative burdens may have an effect on the judges' ten-
dency to publish. Some doubt is cast on this proposition by the high publication percentage 
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3. Who Makes the Decision. Frequency of publication also 
might be affected by who makes the publication decision. Some 
circuits require a majority decision to publish/55 while others per-
mit a single judge to require publication. 56 It is plausible that cir-
cuits that permit a positive publication decision by a single judge 
would publish a higher percentage of their opinions than circuits 
that require a majority. Table 5 provides only mild support for 
TABLE 5 
PUBLICATION RELATED TO DECISION TO PUBLISH 
CIRCUITS THAT REQUIRE A MAJORITY FOR A DECISION TO PUBLISH 
Circuit Published (%) Unpublished(%) 
First 59.3 40.7 
Third 18.1 81.9 
Seventh 30.6 69.4 
Ninth 33.3 66.7 
Tenth 31.1 68.9 
Average 34.5 65.5 
CIRCUITS THAT PERMIT A DECISION TO PUBLISH BY A SINGLE JUDGE 
Circuit Published (%) Unpublished (%) 
D.C. 27.8 72.2 
Second 38.9 61.1 
Fourth 28.0 72.0 
Fifth a 58.6 41.4 
Sixth 27.2 72.8 
Eighth 68.2 31.8 
Average 41.4 58.6 
a Although 5TH Cm. R. 21 does not explicitly address the issue, it has been construed as 
requiring a unanimous decision not to publish. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970). 
that the largest circuit, the Fifth, displays. Because the Fifth Circuit is also the only one of 
the six largest circuits without a presumption against publication, its high publication per-
centage seems to support the conclusion in the text. 
55 See 1ST Cm. R. app. B(b)(4); THnm CIRCUIT PLAN paras. 1, 2; 7TH CIR. R. 35(d)(l); 
9TH Cm. R. 2l(d); lOTH Cm. R. 17(c). 
66 See DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN; 4TH Cm. R. IS(b) (author or majority de-
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that hypothesis. The one-vote circuits publish an average of 41.4% 
of their opinions, while majority-vote circuits publish 34.5%. It is 
difficult to assume any sort of causal connection from such a small 
differential.67 
IV. RESULTS OF THE STUDY: AN EMPmiCAL AssESSMENT oF CosTs 
AND BENEFITS 
A. Benefits 
The major impetus for the limited publication movement has 
been the dramatically increasing caseload of the circuit courts. 
Limited publication can help the judges to deal with the glut, it is 
argued, because an unpublished opinion takes much less judicial 
time and effort to prepare than a published opinion.68 If nonpubli-
cation does result in significant savings, those savings should be 
revealed in two ways: swifter justice and increased judicial 
productivity. 
1. Swifter Justice. If justice delayed is justice denied, then 
swifter justice obviously is an important goal. At the appellate 
level, the speed of justice can be measured by the number of days 
between the time at which the record was complete and the date of 
cides); SIXTH CIRcUIT PLAN para. 2; 8TH Cm. R. app. para. 3. See also 2D Cm. R. 0.23 (re-
quiring a unanimous decision not to publish). 
07 There are two other related issues. First, four circuits permit a judge who writes a 
separate opinion to publish even if a panel majority votes not to. DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA 
CIRCUIT PLAN; 7TH Cm. R. 35(d)'(2) (permitting, but advising against, such publication); 8TH 
Cm. R. app. para. 3; 9TH Cm. R. 21(b)(6). Those four circuits publish slightly more fre-
quently than do the other seven (40% to 37.3%, computed from the percentages in Table 2 
supra). Because of the extreme scarcity of unpublished separate opinions, see text at note 
131 infra, it is not surprising that these provisions have no significant effect on publication 
percentages. They may be useful, however, because they help ensure against arbitrariness on 
the part of a majority. 
Second, two circuits will entertain requests by persons outside the court for publication 
of certain decisions. 7TH Cm. R. 35(d)(3); 9TH Cm. R. 21(f). This, too, is a useful concept. 
Although we have suggested previously that the practice may favor institutional litigants, 
Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1178-79, that may not be the case. In the 
Seventh Circuit, 21 requests for publication from outsiders were received "by the Seventh 
Circuit. The Court honored most of the requests, which came from a disparate group. Letter 
to authors from Thomas Strubbe, Clerk (Oct. 7, 1980) (on file with The University of Chi-
cago Law Review). The Ninth Circuit has a variation authorizing staff law clerks to recom-
mend the publication of appropriate decisions. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: 
The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 937, 949-50 (1980). This practice 
appears to lead to a minimal increase in publication rates, if any. The two circuits allowing 
it publish 32.5% of their opinions, while the other nine publish 39.7%. 
" STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 5. 
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the final judgment-turn-around time, for short. Table 6 suggests 
that nonpublication promotes swifter justice. As the table shows, 
turn-around time is considerably shorter if an opinion is not pub-
lished. One out of every five unpublished opinions took no longer 
than three months to resolve, for example, but only one out of 
every thirty-three published cases was decided that quickly. Al-
most half of the unpublished opinions had a turn-around time of 
half a year or less; the comparable figure for published opinions 
was one-fifth. 
TABLE 6 
TIME FOR DECISION 
Turn-Around Published (%) Unpublished (%) 
Time (Days)a 
0-10 0.3 3.8 
11-30 0.4 3.0 
31-60 1.0 6.4 
61-90 2.2 7.4 
91-120 3.8 7.8 
121-150 6.0 10.0 
151-180 6.9 9.9 
181-360 36.7 31.1 
360 or more 42.6 20.7 
SouRcE: Compiled from data on 11,487 cases disposed of during the 1978-1979 Reporting 
Year for which data were available. Statistical Data, supra note 35, Tables 6P, 6U. 
a Measured by the interval between the day the record was complete and the date of final 
judgment. 
Although there can be no doubt that cases culminating in un-
published opinions are resolved more quickly, it is impossible to 
determine how much of that saving can be attributed to limited 
publication. Much may be because unpublished litigation is easier 
to decide. By definition, it contains nothing that requires the crea-
tion of precedent. Whether published or not, it can be disposed of 
without the extra work needed to justify the creation and explain 
the application of new law. 
Nevertheless, anyone who reads even a small number of un-
published opinions must conclude, given their brevity and infor-
mality, that considerable effort has been spared in their prepara-
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tion. Of course, one can then ask whether too much effort was 
spared. That is, does the quality of decision making suffer when 
the judges determine that an opinion need not be published and 
therefore that only a truncated opinion need be written? Before 
asking that question, however, the relation between publication 
and productivity must be examined. 
2. Increased Productivity. If saving time and judicial effort 
in order to improve the courts' ability to handle a heavier caseload 
is the major goal of limited publication, the practice presumably 
should increase judicial productivity.159 It is easier to determine 
whether this is so if we limit ourselves to an investigation of the 
correlation between each circuit's use of limited publication and its 
relative judicial productivity. In other words, do the circuits that 
publish a comparatively small portion of their opinions have a 
comparatively good record of productivity?60 Before that question 
can be addressed, the concept of productivity must be defined. 
Typically, judicial productivity is measured in terms of dispo-
sitions per authorized judgeship. 61 That technique is unsatisfactory 
for two reasons. First, measuring productivity by authorized, but 
unfilled, judgeships does not produce very instructive comparisons. 
This is particularly true given our data, because authorized judge-
ships were increased from 97 to 132 during the study year.62 Be-
cause none of the new judgeships was filled during the study year, 
•• Of course, it is entirely possible that limited publication saves time but that the sav-
ings do not result in increased productivity. For example, instead of being spent in writing 
more decisions, the extra time could be invested in fashioning better-crafted opinions, or in 
more thought on the most difficult cases on the court's docket. 
•• Whether there is any relation between changes in a circuit's limitation of publication 
from year to year and increases or decreases in productivity is, of course, also relevant to 
determining limited publication's impact on productivity. That question is beyond the scope 
of our study because we have data from all the circuits but for only one fiscal year. In other 
words, we have investigated the horizontal question, but not the vertical one. Both methods 
of attack are pursued by Professor Daniel Hoffman of the University of Vermont in an 
unpublished article. D. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions 12 
(1978) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). Professor Hoffman's instruc-
tive work differs from ours in two other respects as well: (1) In determining publication/ 
nonpublication rates, he used a population of "cases decided after argument or submis-
sions." For reasons given in note 45 supra, our test population is the larger group of "cases 
decided with judicial action." (2) He used "dispositions per authorized judgeship" as a mea-
sure of productivity. For reasons given in text at notes 61-63 infra, we have used "corrected 
dispositions per judge" as the measure. 
81 See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 45 • 
.. Id. at 44. 
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using the traditional measure could skew the results significantly. 
Accordingly, we chose to evaluate productivity by using the num-
ber of active circuit judges instead of the number of authorized 
judgeships. A second difficulty with the standard measure of pro-
ductivity is that the circuits use visiting and senior circuit judges 
to decide cases.6 s That practice tends to skew productivity compar-
isons because the several circuits use visiting and senior judges to 
varying extents. Furthermore, if not compensated for, it would 
make total dispositions per active judgeship an inflated measure of 
productivity. We have corrected for these difficulties by sub-
tracting from a circuit's total number of dispositions the share at-
tributable to visiting and senior judges. Combining these two inno-
vations, we measure productivity not by dispositions per 
authorized judgeship, but by dispositions per active circuit judge, 
corrected for the participation of senior and visiting judges: "cor-
rected dispositions per judge," for short. 
We now return to the central question: Is productivity posi-
tively correlated with nonpublication? The first column of Table 7 
lists the circuits in order of productivity, from most corrected dis-
positions per judge to least. The second lists each circuit's cor-
rected dispositions per judge. The third column gives the percent-
age of each circuit's total opinion production that was not 
published. Columns two and three show a positive correlation64 of 
0.097, indicating that there is scant tendency for circuits that pub-
lish less to produce more. 
Our data thus provide no support for the hypothesis that lim-
ited publication enhances productivity.65 It must be borne in mind, 
however, that limiting publication is only one of a host of variables 
that may affect productivity. The low productivity figures for the 
District of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit, for example, 
might well be attributable more to the great variety and complex-
ity of the regulatory and commercial appeals that those courts 
must decide than to their publication habits. Other variables in-
es Id. at 50-51. 
" A correlation is a report of the coincidence of two phenomena: x and y. A positive 
correlation coefficient indicates that the value of the x variable increases in proportion to 
the value of the y variable. The correlation coefficients discussed in this article were com-
puted with the Spearman Rho formula. Significance was tested with standard significance 
tables. See generally D. ~~ARNETT & J. MURPHY, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ch. 12 
(2d ed. 1980). · , 
•• Professor Hoffman's study also found essentially no relationship between nonpubli-
cation and productivity. See D. Hoffman, supra note 60, at 11-26. 
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elude the percentage of cases that are argued orally, 66 the extent to 
which central staff is used to prepare opinions, and the geographi-
cal size of the circuit.67 Absent the ability to control or even quan-
tify some of those variables, it is impossible to be certain of the 
effect of limited publication on productivity. 
Circuit 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Third 
Seventh 
Tenth 
First 
Ninth 
Secondb 
Eighth 
D.C. 
TABLE 7 
PRODUCTIVITY AND PUBLICATION 
Productivity 
(Corrected Dispositions 
per Judge)a 
140.9 
138.6 
113.2 
108.4 
106.4 
101.4 
99.2 
84.7 
76.0 
72.0 
61.6 
Unpublished Opinions 
(%) 
72.0 
41.4 
72.8 
81.9 
69.4 
68.9 
40.7 
66.7 
61.1 
31.8 
72.2 
a Calculated from dispositions per circuit in Table 1 supra; participation by senior and 
visiting judges in ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 35, at 51; and number of active circuit judges 
in id. at 45. 
b Because only the Second Circuit issues an appreciable number of oral opinions, its total 
dispositions from Table 1 were increased by 195 oral opinions. Calculated by the authors 
from data supplied by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
•• Oral argument takes time, of course. In addition, it can be a bottleneck in the appel-
late process, because a court operating by traditional procedures cannot decide more cases 
than it can hear, and there are physical limitations on the number of cases it can hear. See 
P. CARRINGTON, D. MEAnoR & M. RosENBERG, supra note 3, at 19. Some courts have re-
ported dramatic increases in output after establishing a system of curtailed oral argument. 
See Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969). 
17 Geography plays an important role in relative judicial productivity. Travel time is 
much greater in some circuits than in others. 
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B. Costs of Limited 'Publication 
The sections that follow examine the costs of limited publica-
tion. Two of those costs, suppression of precedent and diminished 
quality, accompany the benefits of swifter justice and savings of 
judicial effort. A third is the disparate impact of nonpublication, 
leading to the concern that some classes of litigants may be denied 
equal access to the courts. A final cost is systemic: the ultimate 
effect of limited publication is to transform the courts of appeals 
into certiorari courts in some instances. 
1. Opinion Quality. Anyone who has read a large number of 
unpublished opinions must conclude that they are, as a group, far 
inferior in quality to the opinions found in the Federal Reporter. 
Although judgments about quality are largely subjective, some 
quantification of the differences between published and unpub-
lished opinions is possible. 
a. Length. Proponents of limited publication argue that time 
can be saved in the preparation of opinions that will not be pub-
lished because they need not contain complete recitations of the 
facts or exhaustive discussions of the relevant legal principles.68 
Hence, unpublished opinions should be considerably shorter than 
their published counterparts. 69 This is confirmed by Tables 8 and 
9. In every circuit, more than 55% of all unpublished opinions 
88 See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 5. 
co For obvious reasons, we were unable to perform evaluations on the total of nearly 
8000 unpublished opinions produced during the Reporting Year, see text and notes at notes 
42-45 supra. Accordingly, we chose a stratified sample of about 10% of the unpublished 
opinions for that portion of the study; the population of that sample is shown in Table A. 
The sample was "stratified" in this sense: For each termination reported by the Admin-
istrative Office there is also a "Method of Disposition" reported. It can be (1) written 
opinion, (2) memorandum decision, (3) decided from the bench, (4) by court order without 
opinion, (5) by consent, or (6) other. See J.S. 34, box 12. We stratified our sample by ensur-
ing that the 10% of the total population included 10% of the cases decided by each of 
methods 1, 2, 4, and 6. We did so because we believed that there might be differences in 
quality based on method of disposition. We eliminated cases decided by methods 3 and 5 
because they did not result in written case-dispositive orders resulting from judicial action, 
and hence could not be evaluated for quality or measured for length. 
Our sample was not exactly 10%. It varied from circuit to circuit for three reasons. 
First, the selections were made from a preliminary list of terminations-really docket num-
bers-prepared for us by the Administrative Office. Not every docket number represents an 
opinion; because some cases are consolidated for argument or opinion, several docket num-
bers may produce only one opinion. Hence, our original selection of 10% of docket numbers 
actually produced a sample of opinions that typically was closer to 12% of the total opinion 
population. Second, some of the opinions that we requested from the circuit court clerks 
were never sent. Third, some opinions originally listed as unpublished were later published. 
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TABLE 8 
LENGTH OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Circuit 
D.C. 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Tenth 
Below 
50 Words 
(%) 
45.2 
25.0 
45.4 
70.3 
42.9 
62.5 
6.0 
7.6 
15.8 
43.2 
13.0 
50-99 
Words 
(%) 
28.6 
12.5 
20.4 
19.4 
15.6 
7.0 
22.6 
15.1 
21.0 
9.1 
22.3 
100-299 
Words 
(%) 
16.7 
43.8 
23.4 
5.6 
21.5 
17.2 
61.9 
37.6 
31.6 
18.0 
20.4 
300-499 
Words 
(%) 
7.2 
16.3 
7.8 
1.1 
9.6 
9.1 
8.4 
11.3 
10.6 
14.4 
11.2 
500-
Words 
(%) 
2.4 
12.6 
3.2 
3.3 
10.8 
4.0 
1.2 
29.0 
21.1 
15.4 
33.4 
SOURCE: Stratified sample of the 7720 unpublished opinions in Statistical Data, supra note 
35, Table 5U. See Table A and note 69 supra. 
NOTE: Figures for each circuit may not add up to 100% because of rounding. 
(footnote 69 continued) 
TABLE A 
SAMPLE POPULATION 
Circuit Number of Unpublished Percentage of Total 
Opinions Analyzed Unpublished Dispositions 
D.C. 61 12.1 
First 17 11.6 
Second 71 12.6 
Third 123 12.4 
Fourth 92 10.3 
Fifth 101 10.3 
Sixth 96 10.6 
Seventh 92 12.5 
Eighth 25 12.0 
Ninth 146 11.8 
Tenth 67 12.1 
Total 891 
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TABLE 9 
LENGTH OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Circuit Below 500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-
500 Words Words Words Words Words 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
D.C. 3.3 15.0 50.0 15.0 16.7 
First 2.7 26.0 52.1 15.1 4.2 
Second 11.1 12.4 51.7 18.0 6.7 
Third 4.2 14.9 50.0 17.6 13.6 
Fourth 23.4 29.9 33.8 9.1 3.9 
Fifth 18.8 24.2 43.6 7.3 6.0 
Sixth 30.1 16.4 39.8 11.0 2.7 
Seventh 4.5 11.4 73.9 4.5 5.7 
Eighth 16.8 29.8 48.1 4.6 0.8 
Ninth 18.5 24.6 44.7 10.6 1.8 
Tenth 3.2 28.1 61.0 7.9 0.0 
SouRCE: Calculated from all opinions reported in volumes 595-600 of Federal Reporter (2d). 
Those six volumes contained substantial numbers of opinions from the survey year. 
NoTE: Figures for each circuit may not add up to 100% because of rounding. 
were shorter than 300 words. In six circuits, more than 40% of the 
unpublished opinions were shorter than 100 words. Published 
opinions, by contrast, are considerably longer. In nine of the eleven 
circuits more than 80% of all published opinions exceeded 500 
words. In all eleven circuits, the largest group of published opin-
ions was the group between 1000 and 3000 words. If we can safely 
· assume that a relatively long opinion takes more time to prepare 
than a relatively short one, the claim that limited publication saves 
time is justified. 70 
b. Minimum standards. Not only are unpublished opinions 
shorter, they are so short that they raise serious questions concern-
70 If limited publication in fact saves time, but is not correlated with increased produc-
tivity, see text and notes at notes 64-65 supra, we are left with two alternate hypotheses: (I) 
the judges do not translate the time saved into extra dispositions, see note 59 supra; or (2) 
the other variables that affect productivity, see text and notes at notes 66-67 supra, conceal 
the effect of limited publication. 
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ing the exercise of judicial responsibility. Does an opinion shorter 
than fifty words, often only a sentence or two, satisfy the court's 
institutional obligation? 
To answer that question one must first consider the essential 
characteristics of the judicial opinion. At rock bottom, it must an-
nounce the result to the parties and explain to them the court's 
reasoning. 71 It should also explain the result to a higher court and 
thus facilitate review. 72 A final purpose is to "provide the stuff of 
the law":73 rules of law, interpretations of statutes and constitu-
tions, and declarations of public policy. Because the opinion publi-
cation plans clearly indicate that unpublished opinions are not 
designed to accomplish the "lawmaking" function, the present in-
quiry can be limited to whether unpublished opinions perform the 
first two functions satisfactorily. 
A substantial consensus exists concerning the minimum stan-
dards that an opinion must meet if it is to perform those two func-
tions adequately. One formulation states that even a memorandum 
decision must contain at least three elements: (1) the identity of 
the case decided; (2) the ultimate disposition; and (3) the reasons 
for the result. In addition, it is often desirable that the issues be 
stated explicity.74 How well these standards were met by our sam-
ple is shown in Table 10.76 
71 See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 2. 
71 Id. at 2-3. 
71 The phrase is from Lefiar, Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 319 (1971). 
74 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEAnoR & M. RoSENBERG, supra note 3, at 34. In addition, the 
American Bar Association recommends that 
[e]very decision should be supported, at minimum, by a citation of the authority or 
statement of grounds upon which it is based. When the lower court decision was based 
on a written opinion that adequately expresses the appellate court's view of the law, 
the reviewing court should incorporate that opinion or such portions of it as are 
deemed pertinent, or, if it has been published, affirm on the basis of that opinon. 
ABA CoMMISSION ON STANDARDS oF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO AP-
PELLATE CoURTS 58 (1977). Karl Llewellyn said much the same thing: 
The deciding is, in the main, done under felt pressure or even compulsion to follow 
up with a published "opinion" which tells any interested person what the cause is and 
why the decision-under the authorities-is right, and perhaps why it is wise. 
This opinion is addressed also to the losing party and counsel in an effort to make 
them feel at least that they have had a fair break. 
K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAw TRADITION 26 (1960). One survey of attorneys found that 
more than two-thirds of the respondents believed that "the due process clause of the Con-
stitution should be held to require courts of appeals to write 'at least a brief statement of 
the reasons for their decisions.'" HRusKA REPoRT, supra note 18, at 49 (quoting a survey 
undertaken by the Commission). 
76 An opinion was listed as meeting minimum standards if it gave some indication of 
what the case was about and some statement of the reasons for the decision. Often a single 
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TABLE 10 
SATISFACTION OF MINIMUM STANDARDS IN UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
• Circuit Reasoned Opinions (%) Decided on the No Discernible 
Basis of the Justification 
Opinion Below (%) (%) 
D.C. 34.1 4.9 61.0 
First 68.8 6.3 25.0 
Second 45.3 23.4 31.3 
Third 13.6 1.1 85.2 
Fourth 46.0 41.0 13.0 
Fifth 36.0 5.0 59.0 
Sixth 71.5 7.0 21.5 
Seventh 77.5 1.3 21.3 
Eighth 57.9 5.3 36.8 
Ninth 65.8 0.0 34.2 
Tenth 79.6 13.0 7.4 
SouRcE: Compiled by the authors from the stratified sample in Table A supra. See note 75 
supra. 
NoTE: Figures for each circuit may not add up to 100% because of rounding. 
Three circuits recorded double-digit percentages in the second 
category, cases decided on the basis of the opinion below. That sort 
of opinion provides a satisfactory explanation of the result to the 
parties, at least to the extent that the opinion below gives reasons 
for the result. By and large, the explanation is adequate only with 
respect to the parties, because most district court and administra-
tive agency decisions are not published or readily accessible. Thus, 
the bar and the general public rarely will be able to oversee appel-
late decisions that culminate in a decision by reference. Another 
drawback to a decision by reference is that it may leave litigants 
citation of precedent was considered satisfactory if the precedent was narrowly directed to 
the problem at hand; a citation to the general standard of review of an administrative or 
district court decision was not considered sufficient. Also considered insufficient to meet 
minimum standards were baldly conclusory opinions such as "appellant's contentions are 
frivolous and without merit," or "the conviction is supported by substantial evidence." 
The reliability of the coding of opinions was established as follows: Each of the authors, 
using the coding method described above, applied it independently to all of the opinions in 
the sample. We agreed on 88% of the opinions for all circuits. 
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with the feeling that the appellate court never really gave the case 
a fresh look. A short statement of the reasons for the decision in 
the appellate court's own words provides more evidence that seri-
ous thought has gone into the decision than does a blanket ap-
proval of the opinion below. 
It is the third category, decisions with no discernible justifica-
tion, that raises the issue of judicial irresponsibility most strik-
ingly. 76 A decision without articulated reasons might well be a de-
cision without reasons or one with inadequate or impermissible 
reasons. That is not to suggest that judges will be deliberately arbi-
trary or decide cases without adequate grounds. The discipline of 
providing written reasons, however, often will show weaknesses or 
inconsistencies in the intended decision that may compel a change 
in the rationale or even in the ultimate result. Even if judges con-
scientiously reach correct results, an opinion that does not disclose 
its reasoning is unsatisfactory. Justice must not only be done, it 
must appear to be done. The authority of the federal judiciary 
rests upon the trust of the public and the bar. Courts that articu-
late no reasons for their decisions undermine that trust by creating 
the appearance of arbitrariness. 
The decision without discernible justification takes various 
forms in the several circuits. Perhaps the most flagrant failure to 
provide reasons occurs in the Fifth Circuit. A substantial number 
of unpublished decisions by the court read simply "Affirmed. See 
Local Rule 21."77 The District of Columbia Circuit decides some 
cases "substantially upon the basis of the opinion below," a prac-
•• The practice of deciding cases with no articulated reasons has been roundly con-
demned by commentators, lawyers, and judges. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 451-52 
{testimony of Edward Hickey, President, Bar Association of the Seventh Circuit); id. at 555 
{testimony of Willard Lassers on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at 826 {testimony of Judge 
Doyle of the Tenth Circuit); id. at 933 {testimony of Professor Haworth); id. at 951 {testi-
mony of Professor Carrington); id. at 1107 {testimony of Judge Skelton of the Court of 
Claims); Note, supra note 4, at 134-35. 
11 5TH Cm. R. 21 authorizes such a truncated order when the court finds 
{1) that a judgment of the District Court is based on findings of fact which are not 
clearly erroneous, {2) that the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient, 
{3) that the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole; and the Court also determines that no error of law appears and 
an opinion would have no precedential value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or 
enforced without opinion. 
Affirming under this rule thus is not a decision by reference, but simply a declaration that 
the decision below was not wrong. Furthermore, the failure even to refer to the opinion 
below adds another layer of obscurity to the decisional process. 
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tice even less satisfactory than the usual decision by reference be-
cause it does not indicate which portions of the opinion below are 
accepted and which are rejected. The Third Circuit produces a 
large number of opinions that simply list the appellant's conten-
tions and then order that the judgment be affirmed. That practice, 
although perhaps more instructive than a one-word affirmance, 
gives no indication why each contention was rejected, nor does it 
give any indication that the court gave any serious thought to the 
appellant's brief. Several circuits employ what might best be de-
scribed as form orders or judgments.78 These orders recite that "af-
ter due consideration" or "upon a review of the record and the 
briefs of the parties," the "appeal is dismissed as frivolous" or "ap-
pellant's contentions are without merit." 
C. Quality and Productivity 
The percentage of below-standard unpublished opinions varies 
greatly among the circuits, from a high of 85% in the Third Circuit 
to a low of 7% in the Tenth Circuit. It might be expected that 
those circuits with the highest percentage of below-standard un-
published opinions are the most overworked. That is, short opin-
ions may be necessary in order to permit those courts to keep up to 
date. The data in Table 11, however, suggest that such is not the 
case. 
The first column lists the circuits in order of productivity.79 
The second displays the percentage of below-standard unpublished 
opinions.80 The data show no positive correlation.81 In other words, 
78 The Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits make some use of the formula type 
order. 
•• See Table 7 supra. 
80 See Table 10 supra. 
81 In fact the correlation was negative: -.140. Another way to test the hypothesis that 
very short opinions are necessary to high productivity is to correlate productivity with the 
percentage of minimum standard opinions produced. That would remedy a possible defect 
in Table 11. The Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit show relatively low percentages 
both of below-standard opinions and of minimum standard opinions. See Table 10 supra. 
This is the result of high percentages of decisions by reference. It may be that the lack of 
correlation in Table 11 is caused by the fact that the most productive circuit, the Fourth, 
relies to a large extent on decisions by reference. This difficulty can be eliminated by corre-
lating the percentage of minimum standard opinions with productivity. If the hypothesis 
that short opinions are necessary to productivity is correct, we should find a strong negative 
correlation. Once again the hypothesis is not proved. As shown in Table B, there is a nega-
tive correlation, but it is quite weak: -.047. 
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TABLE 11 
PRODUCTIVITY AND BELOW-STANDARD UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
Circuit 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Third 
Seventh 
Tenth 
First 
Ninth 
Second 
Eighth 
D.C. 
Productivity (Corrected 
Dispositions per Judge) 
140.9 
138.6 
113.2 
108.4 
106.4 
101.4 
99.2 
84.7 
76.0 
72.0 
61.6 
SoURcE: Tables 7, 10 supra. 
(footnote 81 continued) 
TABLE B 
Percentage of 
Unpublished Opinions 
That Are Below 
·standard 
13.0 
59.0 
21.5 
85.2 
21.3 
7.4 
25.0 
34.2 
31.3 
36.8 
61.0 
PRODUCTIVITY AND MINIMUM STANDARD OPINIONS 
Circuit Productivity (Corrected Percentage of Unpublished 
Dispositions per Judge) Opinions That Meet 
Minimum Standards 
Fourth 140.9 46.0 
Fifth 138.6 36.0 
Sixth 113.2 71.5 
Third 108.4 13.6 
Seventh 106.4 77.5 
Tenth 101.4 79.6 
First 99.2 68.8 
Ninth 84.7 65.8 
Second 76.0 45.3 
Eighth 72.0 57.9 
D.C. 61.6 34.1 
SouRCE: Tables 7, 10 supra. 
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the most productive circuits were not the ones that produced the 
most substandard opinions. 82 
The use by the circuits of excessively brief opinions with no 
discernible justification cannot be supported. The cost of this prac-
tice is high; use of such opinions subverts many of the goals of 
appellate justice. The benefit of the practice is doubtful at best; 
the data reveal no correlation between productivity and the use of 
cryptically short opinions. 
2. Suppressed Precedent. The lower quality of unpublished 
opinions may be the most important of the costs of limited publi-
cation, but it has not been the most controversial. That role has 
been played by the question of suppressed precedent.83 By sup-
pressed precedent, we mean a case that ought to have been pub-
•• Nor did the most productive circuits produce the most very short unpublished opin-
ions, as is shown in the table below: 
TABLE C 
PRODUCTIVITY AND VERY SHORT OPINIONS 
Circuit 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Third 
Seventh 
Tenth 
First 
Ninth 
Second 
Eighth 
D.C. 
SoURCE! Tables 8, 10 supra. 
Productivity (Corrected 
Dispositions per Judge) 
140.9 
138.6 
113.2 
108.4 
106.4 
101.4 
99.2 
84.7 
76.0 
72.0 
61.6 
Again the correlation is weak: .151. 
Percentage of Unpublished 
Opinions That Are Shorter 
than 50 Words 
42.9 
62.5 
6.0 
70.3 
7.6 
13.0 
25.0 
43.2 
45.4 
15.8 
45.2 
As might be expected, there is a high positive correlation between the percentage of 
below-standard opinions and the percentage of opinions shorter than 50 words: .758, as is 
shown in Table D. 
For an explanation of how correlations are calculated and their significance, see note 64 
supra. . 
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lished but was not.84 Our examination has convinced us, however, 
that suppressed precedent is not an insuperable problem of limited 
publication. The discussion that follows examines the problem of 
suppressed precedent generally and in the specific contexts of re-
versals and separate opinions. 
a. Generally. Our sample of unpublished opinions85 revealed 
a number of instances of suppressed precedent. It is difficult to 
estimate how widespread the phenomenon was. An opinion that 
relies on no authority, for example, could be said to be breaking 
new ground, or it may only be that the issue is so well settled that 
citation would be superfluous.88 To determine with any certainty 
whether an opinion makes new law requires a familiarity with the 
substantive law of the circuits that is far beyond the scope of this 
study. The problem of identifying suppressed precedent becomes 
even inore acute when one considers that discussions of "settled" 
law in novel settings may in fact shift the moorings of the "settled" 
principles. Detection of such nuances is difficult. Nevertheless, 
some conclusions can be drawn with reasonable assurance. 
{footnote 82 continued) 
TABLED 
BELOW-STANDARD OPINIONS AND VERY SHORT OPINIONS 
Circuit 
Third 
D.C. 
Fifth 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Second 
First 
Seventh 
Sixth 
Fourth 
Tenth 
Percentage of Unpublished 
Opinions That Are Below 
Standard 
85.2 
61.0 
59.0 
36.8 
34.2 
31.3 
25.0 
21.3 
21.5 
13.0 
7.4 
SoURcE: Tables 8, 10 supra. 
Percentage of Unpublished 
Opinions That Are 
Shorter than 50 Words 
70.3 
45.2 
62.5 
15.8 
43.2 
45.4 
25.0 
7.6 
6.0 
42.9 
13.0 
11 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 4. 
" Our use of the word "suppressed" is not intended to connote in any way that these 
cases are being deliberately concealed. 
11 See note 69 supra for a description of the sample. 
•• Or, to put the last point differently, the case may have provided materials for chang-
ing the law but the court refused to play the role of artisan. 
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We discovered no widespread "hiding" of law-declaring opin-
ions-that is, opinions that clearly broke new ground on important 
issues. There were, to be sure, some exceptions.87 One example is 
Trible v. Brown.88 There a Congressman sought to compel the De-
partment of Defense to file a report on two shipyard programs. 
The litigation raised interesting questions of standing,89 jus-
ticiability, and remedy. In spite of its obvious importance, the 
Fourth Circuit did not publish the opinion.90 
Cases like Trible were unusual.91 More frequent examples of 
suppressed precedent involved questions of state law, often in rela-
tion to federal statutory or constitutional law. Such opinions cer-
tainly should be published if they resolve novel issues. In DeBona 
v. Vizasr for example, the Tenth Circuit decided that two police-
men had not been denied due process when their positions were 
terminated. The decision turned on whether a Colorado statute 
created a protected property interest, 93 and apparently it was a 
case of first impression. The importance of the court's resolution of 
the problem was increased because the state statute involved had 
not been construed since 1900. In those circumstances, the resolu-
tion of the due process claim deserved general circulation.9' 
87 Eyes more attuned than ours to the subtleties of criminal procedure might have 
spotted more "clear" precedent. But the point is there were few cases that grabbed the 
attention of the alert general reader. Others who have done more limited studies, particu-
larly in state appellate courts, report reading unpublished opinions that begin, in effect, 
"This is a case of first impression in our state." See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 3, at 391; 
Newbern & Wilson, supra note 3, at 48-56. We have few such stories to tell. 
88 No. 79-1228 (4th Cir. May 2, 1979). 
•• Plaintiff argued that be needed the reports in order to exercise his oversight role 
effectively. Compare Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (alleged interfer-
ence with exercise of legislative power gives Congressmen standing) with Harrison v. Bush, 
553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no standing where Congressman's interest in el).forcement of 
statute is no greater than that of an ordinary citizen). 
•• It may have been held back from publication because it originally was an oral opin-
ion. That does not detract, however, from its status as_ a law-declaring opinion. It was a 
judicial expression on important legal issues. 
81 Often an opinion that at first appeared clearly to warrant publication seemed less 
important on closer examination. AT&T v. Grady, No. 78-2316 (7th Cir. Dec. 14, 1978), 
provides an example. The issue there, whether a nonparty, the federal government, should 
be granted a modification of a protective order so it could gain access to discovered docu-
ments, was said by the court to have been resolved in different ways by trial courts and to 
be "a case of appellate first impression." I d., slip op. at 5. The opinion turned on the partic-
ular facts of the case at bar, however, considerably reducing its value as precedent. Although 
the discussion probably was significant enough to warrant publication, it was not as impor-
tant as the court's statements might have led the reader to believe. 
•• No. 77-1299 (lOth Cir. Dec. 18, 1978). 
•• See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
a< See also United States ex rel. Aurora Pump Co. v. Ranger Constr. Co., No. 77-1991 
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Suppressed precedent can also be found in cases resolving 
novel questions of state law. The federal courts' reluctance to pub-
lish opinions on state law questions is understandable. Still, such 
opinions can provide useful guidance in areas where no state prece-
dent exists. An example is Grant Square Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Magnavox Co., 915 a contract case where the court relied in part on 
promissory estoppel, but cited no state cases accepting that 
doctrine. 98 
Although nonpublication of law-declaring opinions does occur, 
our review of the opinions in our sample has convinced us that it is 
not a major problem with limited publication. The handful of ex-
amples we discovered constituted less than 1% of the nearly 900 
opinions in our sample.97 
Perhaps more common than unpublished law-declaring opin-
ions were cases that were of public interest because they revealed 
defects in the law or its administration.98 Those opinions deserved 
wider circulation in order to reveal these flaws to a large audience, 
which is the best way to ensure their correction. 
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation 
Act,99 for example, was designed to provide employees with "swift 
compensation for work-related injuries, regardless of fault, and the 
cost of resolving disputes relating to such compensation would be 
kept to a minimum."100 Unfortunately, the plan does not always 
(4th Cir. Sept. 6, 1978). The question there was whether timely notice was given under the 
Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1976). The court's sensible construction of the statute was 
not supported by any citation. If Aurora Pump was a case of first impression, it should have 
been published. 
Another example is Hale v. Walker, No. 78-1443 (lOth Cir: Mar. 12, 1979) (no cause of 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for failure to expunge an arrest record; court cited no 
authority for its holding). 
•• No. 77-1070 (lOth Cir. Sept. 6, 1978). 
" See also Gard v. United States, 594 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1979), which applied the 
Nevada sightseer statute, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.510 (1967), in a case of first impression. 
Although originally unpublished, the case subsequently was ordered published, which indi-
cated a commendable, if belated, awareness of the importance of cases of this type. 
17 See note 69 supra for a description of the sample. 
" Several circuits provide expressly for publication of such opinions. The Fourth, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits, for instance, call for publication of an opinion that "criticizes 
existing law." 4TH Cm. R. 18(a)(iii); 7TH Cm. R. 35(c)(iii); 9TH CIR. R. 21 (b)(3). The District 
of Columbia, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require publication of an opinion 
that "involves an issue of continuing public interest." DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN 
para. e; 4TH Cm. R. 18(a)(ii); 7TH Cm. R. 35(c)(ii); 8TH Cm. R. app. t 4(d); 9TH Cm. R. 
2l(b)(4). 
" 33 u.s.c. § 901 (1976). 
100 Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp. v. Norat, No. 78-1029, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir. 
Feb. 8, 1979). 
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work that well, as the Third Circuit noted in one unpublished 
opinion that described in detail one longshoreman's continuing ef-
forts-eight years after an accident-to obtain relief.101 The court 
reluctantly remanded to the agency. Publication of this story 
might have helped bring about change; certainly its suppression 
will not help achieve that goal. 
In similar fashion, American Bankers Association v. Con-
nelP02 described problems associated with fund transfers by 
financial institutions. The court noted that it was "convinced that 
the methods of transfer authorized by the agency regulations have 
outpaced the methods and technology of fund transfer authorized 
by the existing statute."108 Such a statement from an influential 
court could have stimulated reform. Instead, it was not published. 
Courts are uniquely situated to spot problems in the applica-
tion of a statute or the workings of an agency. Their comments on 
the subject can enlighten those in a position to act. There is no 
reason not to publish those expressions. 
A closely related type of case contains commentary by judges 
on the workings of their own courts. The judiciary has an institu-
tional obligation to set its own house in order. Judges should not 
be permitted to sweep their peers' shortcomings under the rug by 
nonpublication. Those who have the duty to supervise the judici-
ary should see the whole picture, warts and all. Further, public ex-
posure of the faults of judges may have a salutary effect on per-
formance. Reversal in public is a far different matter than what 
amounts to a private reprimand in an unpublished opinion. 
Several unpublished opinions in our sample involved mistakes 
made by district judges that led to reversal or at least admonition 
by the circuit court. We believe that those cases should have been 
made public. Elementary mistakes in routine cases deserve public 
attention; judicial accountability cannot exist if no one but the cir-
cuit court is aware of judicial errors. When an appellate court must 
remind a district judge of the necessity of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, 104 for instance, something is seriously amiss. The same can be 
said when a court must reinstate a complaint because it was "dis-
missed pursuant to a procedure this court reviewed and found defi-
101 !d. 
102 No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1979). 
103 !d., slip op. at 2. -
1 
.. See Bergeron v. Exxon Corp., No. 78-2318 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 1979). 
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cient [the preceding year]."~05 Pressure through publicity should 
be brought to bear on such trial judges. 
The nonpublication of opinions that reveal problems tran-
scending mere mistake is even more objectionable. Such cases give 
rise to a strong suspicion that the court does not care to wash its 
dirty linen in public. A prime example is United States v. Rit-
ter, 106 where the full Tenth Circuit vacated an order issued by 
Chief Judge Willis Ritter of the District of Utah. The order in 
question prohibited the judge's "court reporter from carrying out 
the duties imposed upon him by law."~07 The decision came at a 
time when Congress was considering a proposal to create a proce-
dure, short of impeachment, to hold federal judges accountable; 
the problems of Chief Judge Ritter figured in the debate.108 The 
scope of the problems he had created clearly should have been re-
vealed to a directly interested Congress and legal community. 
Suppression of law-declaring opinions does not appear to be a 
major problem of limited publication. That is not surprising, given 
our findings concerning the quality of decision making in unpub-
lished opinions. The concern should not be the suppression of pre-
cedent; instead, it should be whether the judges examined the 
cases closely enough to see if precedent should be made.109 The 
major danger we see is that the early decision not to publish an 
opinion means that not enough care will go into its preparation to 
stimulate the thought necessary to an adequate consideration of 
whether precedent should be created. That basic issue of judicial 
responsibility should be the concern of the judiciary and of the 
public. 
More troublesome than the suppression of law-declaring opin-
ions was the nonpublication of decisions suggesting that statutes, 
agencies, or the courts themselves are not performing up to par. 
Appellate courts should recognize that they have a unique vantage 
point from which to observe the workings of our society. Observa-
tions from that point are of interest to all. 
105 McGruder v. Jeansonne, No. 78-3236 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1979). See also Moorer v. 
Griffin, No. 77-3580 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1978), where the District Court dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to prosecute. The Sixth Circuit reversed because the plaintiff was in jail 
and the court had not directed that his body be produced for argument. 
108 No. 77-1491 (lOth Cir. Aug. 11, 1978). 
1
.., Id., slip op. at 1. 
108 S. REP. No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978). 
10
' Some observers have worried that the Seventh Circuit, for example, has suppressed 
too many law-declaring opinions. 'See Hearings, supra note 4, at 556 (statement of Willard 
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b. Separate opinions. Nonpublication presents a special 
problem when an unpublished opinion contains a concurring or 
dissenting opinion. Two major factors argue for publication in 
cases that generate separate opinions. First are the stated premises 
of limited publication, which is a treatment supposedly reserved 
for cases that do not implicate the lawmaking function of the 
court110-routine, uncontroversial cases. Cases that contain dis-
sents or concurrences are, by definition, controversial; the court 
disagrees either about the result to be reached or about the 
method used to reach it. Accordingly, few decisions with separate 
9pinions should go unpublished. 
Second is the role played by the separate opinion in our judi-
cial system.111 Separate opinions serve to restrain judical advocacy. 
Like all advocates, the judicial advocate can lose sight of the other 
side. The separate opinion restricts the judicial advocate because it 
assures him of a public airing of a contrary view of the same facts 
and law.112 The separate opinion also performs an important cor-
rective function, for it criticizes the result and reasoning of the ma-
jority, appealing for correction by a higher court, a future court, or 
a legislature. It is "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to 
the intelligence of a later day."118 
In order to perform these functions adequately, the separate 
opinion must be published.11" The judicial advocate will not be re-
Lassers). See also Comment, supra note 4. Our review convinced us that, instead, the Sev-
enth Circuit has a commendable record of explaining its decisions. Some incidental suppres-
sion of precedent in that process seems a legitimate price to pay; it is preferable to a court's 
avoiding any risk of suppressing a law-declaring opinion by not providing any reasons for its 
unpublished decisions. 
110 See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 1-2. 
111 See generally W. REYNoLDs, supra note 6, at 23-27; Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 
CoLUM. L. REV. 923, 926-28 (1962); Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinions in Courts of Last Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 394 (1952). 
111 Stephens, supra note 111, at 403-04. 
111 C. HuGHES, THE SUPREME CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928) (describing dis-
sent in courts of last resort). 
m One important function of the separate opinion can be accomplished even if the 
opinion goes unpublished. Judge Fuld wrote that "the dissent is an assurance that the case 
was fully considered and thoroughly argued by the bench as a whole and was not merely 
adopted as written by one member." Fuld, supra note 111, at 927. An unpublished dissent 
or concurrence may still provide that assurance, at least to the parties and the lower court. 
It can, however, fail even that limited function. Consider National Treasury Employees 
Union v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, No. 78-1282 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 1979). The 
opinion reads as follows: 
This cause came on to be heard on the record on appeal from the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, and was argued by counsel. While the issues 
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strained by a dissent that never sees the light of day. An appeal for 
correction is largely useless if the appeal is not disseminated to 
those with the power to correct the majority's errors.1115 
Thus, both the criteria for cases that should remain unpub-
lished and the functions of the separate opinions lead to the con-
clusion that few cases that generate separate opinions should go 
unpublished. The data from the survey year, as illustrated by 
Table 12, confirm that hypothesis. The frequency of separate opin-
ions among the circuits' published opinions ranged between 2.8% 
and 21.1%; in the unpublished opinions it ranged from a low of 
0% to a high of 1.5%. Taking all the circuits together, the average 
frequency of separate opinions in published opinions was 12.4%, in 
unpublished opinions 0.5%. Divided courts thus were more than 
20 times more common in cases decided by published opinions 
than in those decided by unpublished opinions. 
The important question, however, is whether any case that is 
sufficiently controversial to generate a separate opinion should go 
unpublished. Of the separate opinions in our sample, two had little 
to offer to the legal literature.116 One was too short to evaluate.117 
The other two, however, should have been published. 
presented occasion no need for an opinion, they have been accorded full consideration 
by the Court. See Local Rule 13(c). 
On consideration of the foregoing, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that 
the judgment of the District Court appealed from in this case is hereby affirmed. 
To that informative recitation, which consists of a printed form with the words "judgment" 
and "affirmed" written in, is added the equally terse "Chief Judge Wright dissents." That 
sort of opinion complete with dissent not only fails to accomplish the restraining and cor-
recting functions but also fails to assure "that the case was fully considered by the bench as 
a whole." It takes 83 words to say to the appellant "you lost 2-1." 
m Another reason to publish opinions with dissents is to ensure that the majority can-
not suppress the views of a dissenting judge. We are not aware of any federal cases where 
that has occurred. The problem has arisen in some state cases, however. In People v. Para. 
No. CRA 15889 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 1979), Judge Jefferson wrote in dissent: 
Initially, it appeared that the majority felt the same as I do regarding the fact that the 
majority opinion merited publication in the Official Reports. When circulated to me, 
the majority opinion was approved by the two justices making up the majority and was 
marked for publication in the Official Reports. It was only after I had circulated my 
dissenting opinion to the two justices who make up the majority that they decided to 
reverse their original position regarding publication in the Official Reports. I do not 
think this reversal of position is justified. 
Id. at 34. 
no In Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, No. 79-1019 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1979), the 
district court dismissed the counterclaim under FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) because the action "in 
equity and good conscience" should not proceed among the present parties due to the 
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TABLE 12 
SEPARATE OPINIONS 
PUBLISHED 
Circuit Total Dissenting Concurring Concurring Separate 
Opinions & Dissenting Opinions 
(%) 
D.C. 194 21 12 8 21.1 
First 214 2 4 0 2.8 
Second 359 28 34 9 19.8 
Third 219 26 10 4 18.3 
Fourth 346 53 6 8 19.4 
Fifth 1385 62 55 9 9.1 
Sixth 340 13 5 6 7.1 
Seventh 325 30 9 8 14.5 
Eighth 448 21 10 2 7.4 
Ninth 618 14 2 9 4.0 
Tenth 251 16 12 4 12.7 
Average 12.4 
UNPUBLISHED 
Circuit Total Dissenting Concurring Concurring Separate 
Opinions & Dissenting Opinions 
(%) 
D.C. 505 2 1 1 0.8 
First 147 0 0 0 0.0 
Second 563 1 0 0 0.2 
Third 991 4 1 0 0.5 
Fourth 890 1 1 0 0.2 
Fifth 978 0 1 0 0.1 
Sixth 908 2 2 0 0.4 
Seventh 736 4 6 1 1.5 
Eighth 209 1 0 0 0.5 
Ninth 1238 2 0 1 0.2 
Tenth 555 3 2 1 1.1 
Average 0.5 
SoURCE: Statistical Data, supra note 35, Tables lP, 2P, 3U, 5U. 
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American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Bingham 
(ATMI) 118 surely deserved public dissemination. It involved an is-
sue that, although arcane, has broad implications. The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act119 provides for judicial review by the 
circuit courts of safety and health standards.120 Often petitions for 
review will be filed in more than one circuit; the case is then heard 
in the circuit in which the first petition was filed.121 A petition filed 
before the issuance of the regulation is considered premature.122 In 
ATMI, the challenged regulation was delivered to the Federal Reg-
ister at 9:00 A.M. and made available to the public at 11:53 A.M. 
Several labor organizations filed petitions for review in the District 
of Columbia Circuit at 8:45 A.M. and 11:55 A.M. ATMI filed at 
8:45:01, 11:00:00 A.M., and exactly noon in the Fourth Circuit.128 
Clearly, the venue for the appeal will be determined by whether 
9:00 A.M. or 11:53 A.M. was the time the regulation was issued. The 
dissent, relying on a provision in the statutory authorization for 
the Federal Register, 11' thought that ATMI had filed first. The 
majority, relying on an interpretive regulation issued by OSHA,125 
held that the unions had filed first. 
court's lack of jurisdiction over a foreign firm that possessed evidence essential to determin-
ing the merits. The court of appeals reversed on the theory that the dismissal was prema-
ture because FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b) permits discovery in foreign countries. The correct time 
for dismissal, said the court, would be after such efforts at discovery had failed. Judge 
MacKinnon concurred; his opinion essentially is a message to the district judge indicating 
those factors mentioned in Rule 19(b) that Judge MacKinnon considered especially 
important. 
United States v. Vera, No. 77-5363, (6th Cir. July 10, 1978), is another case in which the 
separate opinion is of only marginal import. The issue that generated Judge Merritt's con-
currence was defendant's motion to transfer the case from Kentucky to Texas. Defendant 
was engaged in a scheme to distribute marijuana in Kentucky when his airplane crashed and 
was captured in Texas. The District court denied the motion to transfer and was affirmed. 
Judge Merritt concurred even though he would have felt "more comfortable" had the case 
been transferred. Id. at 2. The relevant standard is "for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, and in the interest of justice." FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b). Vera is an unremarkable 
application of that standard. 
117 See note 114 supra. 
111 No. 78-1378 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 1978). 
111 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (1976). 
120 ld. § 655(0. 
121 23 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976). 
122 See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
121 The statement of the facts is taken from Respondent Secretary's Motion to Dismiss 
and to Transfer, ATMI v. Bingham, No. 78-1378 (4th Cir. July 11, 1978) (on file with The 
University of Chicago Law Review). 
114 44 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) (documents to be publicly available immediately after 
filing). 
no 29 C.F.R. § 1911.18(d) (1980). 
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The majority and dissent, then, disagreed upon a rule of 
law-a rule that could be settled one way or the other without 
shaking the legal firmament, but a rule that should be settled. 
Publication would have advanced the ultimate national resolution 
of this issue. 
Another case that should have been published is Burrison v. 
New York City Transit Authority/26 which revealed a longstand-
ing disagreement within a circuit. The issue was the res judicata 
effect of findings in a state criminal or quasi -criminal proceeding 
upon a subsequent federal civil rights litigation. In Burrison and 
other cases, Judge Oakes has consistently favored a much narrower 
scope for the doctrine of res judicata than has the majority.127 The 
issue has also caused a split between the Second Circuit and the 
Sixth Circuit, 128 and it has been the subject of scholarly dispute.129 
It seems odd that, faced with such a controversial question, the 
court should not treat the issues in comprehensive fashion130 and 
publish that treatment. Nonpublication surely is inappropriate for 
cases concerning such a persistently troublesome issue. 
It might be argued that the controversial issues in Burrison 
had already been treated by the court in published opinions. Addi-
tional publication of dissenting views arguably is unnecessary, as 
well as damaging to the collegiality of the court. But frequent pub-
lic airing of disagreement is the only way to settle such stubborn 
disputes, and it may be the only way to attract sufficient attention 
from the Supreme Court to provoke a grant of certiorari. 
After considering the principles underlying limited publication 
and separate opinions, it seems clear that the circuits should adopt 
128 No. 78-7536 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 1979). 
127 See Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.) (in which Judge 
Oakes disagreed with the majority, but concurred in the result because he felt he was bound 
by the "law of the circuit," id. at 522), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Thistlethwaite v. 
New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 
(1974); Tank v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974). 
128 See Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1977). 
129 See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 101-02 & n.113 (1973); 
Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 859 (1976). 
uo The problem here is really more serious than nonpublication; the court's opinion 
contains about 120 words. The facts are omitted entirely and the entire legal discussion 
consists of three case citations. Judge Oakes joined the majority opinion, limiting his disa-
greement to the statement that he adhered to his position in Turco. This may well be an 
instance where nonpublication led to a case receiving less attention than it merited. 
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the rule that all cases containing separate opinions should be pub-
lished. Such a rule would cost little. In the survey year, only thirty-
eight separate opinions went unpublished-0.5% of the total un-
published product of the circuit courts.131 In return for the mini-
mal cost of publishing these few decisions, the courts would be able 
to ensure publication of a group of opinions that should be avail-
able to guide litigants and planners, provoke critical commentary, 
and perhaps interest the Supreme Court in resolving a controver-
sial question. 
c. Reversals. About one in every seven unpublished opinions 
did something other than affirm the opinion below (see Table 13). 
Circuit 
D.C. 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Tenth 
Total 
TABLE 13 
FREQUENCY OF NoNAFFIRMANCE 
In Published 
Opinions (%) 
44 
32 
37 
50 
43 
36 
41 
38 
28 
28 
29 
36 
In Unpublished 
Opinions (%) 
14 
12 
9 
8 
14 
11 
12 
16 
17 
19 
15 
14 
SoURCE: Calculated from Statistical Data, supra note 35, Tables IP, 5U. 
Number of 
Nonaffirming 
Unpublished 
Opinions 
67 
17 
51 
77 
121 
109 
111 
118 
35 
231 
81 
1018 
NOTE: Dismissals for want of prosecution and cases transferred were excluded from both 
numerator and denominator in computing the percentages of nonaffirmance. The former 
figure comprised all instances in which the appellate court did anything other than affirm 
the opinion below or dismiss the appeal. Opinions coded "affirmed in part and reversed in 
.Part" thus were classified as nonaffirmances. 
111 See Table 12 supra. 
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It should not be surprising that the rate of nona:ffirmance in pub-
lished cases is nearly three times that figure. With few exceptions, 
· when one court reverses another, it means that the system has not 
worked properly. Almost by definition, the opinion on appeal is of 
sufficient interest to warrant publication. 
Some reversals reflect mistakes in routine matters on the part 
of district judges. The inability of judges to apply commonplace 
law correctly should be a matter of concern to all.132 Including such 
reversals among the unpublished opinions conceals the problem. 
Earlier, we discussed several examples of unpublished opinions 
correcting plain error by the trial judge.133 Another is Wesley v. 
Green. 134 The trial court had dismissed a complaint because venue 
was improperly laid, without establishing in the record the parties' 
residences. Any such error, however embarrassing, should not be 
kept from public scrutiny.1311 
I 
Reversal on routine matters may signify more than poor 
craftsmanship by the trial judge. It may, for example, point to un-
certainty about the content of governing law. The court of appeals 
may not publisJJ. a reversal because, to it, the governing law was 
clear; such may not be the perception of others. Put differently, 
the unpublished opinion may clarify precedent to such a degree 
that the opinion should be published. Sanchez v. Califano186 was 
such a case. Its outcome turned on the allocation of the burden of 
proof in Social Security disability cases. The court of appeals 
thought the issue determined by its own published precedent. Al-
though the court probably was correct, the precedent was hardly a 
132 The major concern, of course, is a general interest in the quality of justice being 
dispensed. There may also be a more specific concern, however. An example would be a trial 
judge under consideration for elevation to a higher bench; if his reversal rate were abnor-
mally high it might cause second thought. A high reversal rate was one of the problems that 
plagued Judge Carswell when he was nominated to the Supreme Court. See N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 6, 1970, at 24, col. 8. 
1 
.. See text and notes at notes 104-108 supra. 
134 No. 77-2269 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 1978). See also Dawn v. Wenzler, No. 76-3457 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 5, 1978) (failure to permit plaintiff to amend complaint once, which is a matter of 
right under FED. R. Cxv. P. 15(a)). 
135 A similar analysis applies to mistakes by federal law enforcement officials. Even a 
remand based on confession of error by the United States Attorney can be interesting 
enough to warrant publication. United States v. Martin, No. 79-5087 (5th Cir. June 7, 1979), 
contained not only such a confession, but also an observation that departures from FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11 were "very great." Id. That is a most informative comment for anyone inter-
ested in the workings of our criminal justice system. 
138 No. 77-1900 (lOth Cir. Jan. 11, 1979). 
HeinOnline -- 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 619 1981
1981] Limited Publication 619 
model of clarity.137 Publication of Sanchez woUld have helped 
avoid similar difficulties in the future. 
Reversals in routine cases may also reflect a continuing battle 
over the correct legal standard to apply. That is especially likely in 
areas where a large number of frivolous cases arise. The finder of 
fact naturally will seek to dispose of these quickly; the appellate 
court, faced with different pressures, may not be so keen. In Kidd 
v. Mathews/3s for example, the Sixth Circuit, in reversing a denial 
of black lung benefits, noted that the "Secretary [of HEW] has 
again used conflicting medical tests to prevent the establishment of 
the [statutory] presumption."~39 The Secretary's evident unhappi-
ness with the governing legal standard should be exposed, so that 
others will be aware of the dispute and have the opportunity to 
comment on its merits.140 
Finally, for all the reasons discussed above, reversals are quite 
likely to create law. Many of the decisions discussed in the analysis 
of separate opinions and suppressed precedent also were reversals. 
That observation should come as no surprise; where the reversal 
does not turn on correction of plain error, it is likely that the court 
below could not possibly have known the "true" state of the law, 
because it had never been declared. Thus the circuit court is forced 
to make law. If it does not publish its opinion, it creates a sup-
pressed precedent. 
All of the phenomena just discussed weigh strongly in favor of 
publication of all reversals. They tell us interesting things about 
the workings of our legal system, they provide helpful discussion of 
legal concepts, and they sometimes create-or at least clar-
ify-precedent. Furthermore, reversal is an easy criterion to apply. 
Unlike most of the criteria used to select opinions for publication, 
reversal requires no subjective evaluation. Publishing all reversals, 
however, would entail a heavy cost. If all 1018 unpublished non-
affirmances in the survey year141 had been published, the number 
of published opinions would have increased by one-fifth.142 
117 See Keating v. Secretary of HEW, 468 F.2d 788, 790 (lOth Cir. 1972). 
, .. No. 76-2530 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1978). 
uo Id., slip op. at 2. 
140 See also Lykins v. Macintosh, No. 79-6228 (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 1979) (district court 
erred in granting summary judgment in a prisoner's civil rights action). The standard for 
summary judgment in civil rights cases has been a subject of dispute in the Fourth Circuit 
for some time now. See Limited Publication, supra note 4, at 826 n.84. 
141 See Table 13 supra. 
142 There were 4699 published dispositions during the study year. See Table 1 supra. 
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It may be, however, that some middle ground can be found, 
beginning with the observation that not all nonaffirmances deserve 
publication. One case, for example, raised questions concerning 
Michigan's regulation of abortion clinics under a 1974 statute.143 
Mter the decision below and oral argument in the Sixth Circuit, 
Michigan revised the statute. The Sixth Circuit remanded for con-
sideration of the constitutionality of the new law. Because remand 
was based upon an intervening event, passage of a new law, the 
opinion sheds no light on judicial practice. It is the paradigmatic 
opinion without value to anyone other than the litigants. 
Similarly, a "pass-through" of a Supreme Court remand has 
such little value that its publication would be hard to justify.144 A 
decision not to publish a remand in light of a Supreme Court opin-
ion in another case would be more questionable. 
Finally, there is no need to publish a reversal based upon an 
intervening change in the law of the circuit. In that situation, the 
reversal tells us nothing about the quality of decision making in 
either court. It may not even reflect a disagreement over the con-
tent of the substantive law.145 · 
It is impossible to tell from our sample the number of rever-
sals whose publication would not be called for under almost any 
criteria.146 A rough guess, however, is that about half of the non-
affirmances center on reasons unrelated to the workings of the ju-
diciary and the application of precedent.147 We believe that the re-
mainder should be published. Although that would entail a 
significant public cost, the game should be worth the candle. To 
ensure proper handling, we recommend that all reversals be pub-
lished unless the reversal is based upon a standard or fact not 
known to the tribunal below at the time that court or agency made 
its decision. We believe that rule will best square cost with benefit . 
... Abortion Coalition v. Michigan Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 77-1223 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 
1978). 
1
.. A different case would be presented by substantive consideration of a Supreme 
Court opinion before remand to the trial court. That unquestionably should be published. 
In Limited Publication, supra note 4, we recommended publication of all remands of 
Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 839. We now believe publication of a "pass-through" 
unnecessary. 
140 See, e.g., Gardner v. Zahradnick, No. 77-1870 (4th Cir. Sept. 29, 1978) (case held in 
abeyance pending decision in Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 970 (197S); remand in Gardner required by rule established in Gordon). 
"" The major problem is the cryptic nature of so many of the opinions. 
1
•
7 One-half is a rough estimate by the authors after reading all nonaffirmances in the 
sample. 
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d. Summary of apparent costs. Far and away the major 
problem we have identified in connection with limited publication 
is that created by opinions that do not satisfy minimum standards. 
Such opinions do not give the appearance that justice has been 
done. More important, perhaps, shoddy opinions may reflect the 
quality of thought that went into the decision itself. Thoughtless 
opinions are a danger to be guarded against resolutely, especially 
given the lack of correlation between productivity and below-stan-
dard opinions. We believe every opinion can satisfy minimum 
standards. 
Suppressed precedent is a much less significant problem. If 
the courts. of appeals were to recall that opinions of public interest 
should be published, the problem would be lessened. In addition, 
the publication of all decisions with separate opinions, as well as 
many reversals, would help both to avoid suppressed precedent 
and to ensure the circulation of opinions that are independently of 
interest to the public. 
3. A Hidden Cost: Disparate Impact and Certiorari Courts. 
A third cost, the disparate impact of limited publication, may be 
more pernicious, for its full effect stems from the cumulation of 
various devices adopted by the courts of appeals over the last dec-
ade or so to cope with their increasing caseload. An appreciation of 
the problem requires consideration of the interaction between lim-
ited publication and three related phenomena: (1) the dispropor-
tionately low rate of publication of opinions for some types of liti-
gation, such as prisoners' petitions, Social Security cases, and 
appeals in forma pauperis; (2) the decision by the courts of·appeals 
of a substantial number of cases without oral argument; and (3) 
the use by the circuit courts of central staffs of attorneys to aid in 
research and decision making. 
Table 14 displays the subject matter of the appeals terminated 
during the 1978-79 Reporting Year. Most interesting among the 
items in the table is the comparatively high nonpublication per-
centages of prisoner civil rights cases, Social Security cases, and 
prisoner petitions in general. Such high nonpublication rates 
should come as no surprise, however, for those subject matter areas 
are the most likely to produce frivolous litigation because of the 
absence of disincentives to appeal. In addition, cases in those cate-
gories often involve emotional issues, pursued by litigants who seek 
personal vindication without any realistic expectation of legal rem-
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edy. Finally, such claims often turn on factual rather than legal 
issues; hence, there is less that an appellate court can do to review 
the decision below. 
TABLE 14 
NATURE OF APPEAL 
Subject Matter Number of Number of Opinions not 
of Appeal Published Unpublished Published 
Opinions Opinions (%) 
United States, Plaintiff 
Civil Rights 11 8 42.1 
Tax 16 50 75.8 
Land Condemnation 6 9 60.0 
Other 110 102 48.1 
subtotal 143 169 54.2 
United States, Defendant 
Prisoner Petitions 167 456 73.2 
Civil Rights 94 176 65.2 
Social Security 92 305 76.8 
Tort 68 116 63.0 
Other 339 417 55.2 
subtotal 760 1470 65.9 
Private Cases 
Prisoner Petitions 290 1038 72.7 
Civil Rights 398 708 64.0 
Securities 68 75 52.4 
Labor 91 116 56.0 
Tort 272 357 56.8 
Other 696 786 53.0 
subtotal 1815 3080 62.9 
Criminal 1320 1623 55.1 
Total 4038 6342 61.1 
SoURCE: Statistical Data, supra note 35, Tables 7, 19. 
Another problem is the relatively high percentage of unpub-
lished appeals that were filed in forma pauperis. Among unpub-
lished opinions the in forma pauperis rate was 32%, while among 
published opinions the rate was only 20% .us Once again, the dis-
148 These percentages are from Statistical Data, supra note 35, Tables lP, 3P, 4U, 5U. 
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crepancy can be explaine.d by the higher proportion of frivolous in 
forma pauperis appeals because of the absence of disincentives to 
appeal. Nevertheless, both phenomena-the disparate publication 
treatment of certain types of litigation and the relatively high inci-
dence of in forma pauperis cases on the unpublished list-give rise 
to concern for two reasons. 
First, the disparate impact of nonpublication arguably sup-
ports a claim of denial of equal treatment by the courts. The issue 
has been raised before the Supreme Court, but was passed over by 
the Justices.149 Before this study, however, there was no hard evi-
dence that certain classes of litigants were most likely to suffer be-
cause of limited publication. Nevertheless, even with empirical 
confirmation, the constitutional claim is at best colorable, because 
the circuit courts' practices would almost certainly pass present 
equal protection tests. The statistical frivolity of certain types of 
appeals surely provides a rational basis for the disparity, and none 
of the types of litigation is based on a currently recognized suspect 
classification justifying strict scrutiny. 
Whether constitutionally justified or not, litigants in the af-
fected classes still will believe that they have received second class 
justice. That is a problem, for the appearance of justice is nearly as 
important as the fact.1110 The federal courts, which view themselves 
as the guardians of equal justice under law, should be uniquely 
sensitive to claims that their own house may not be in order. 
Second, the danger of routine treatment is another threat to 
judicial responsibility. It is possible that a judge's mind subcon-
sciously will run along these lines: "This is a prisoner civil rights 
action appealed in forma pauperis; past experience tells me there is 
nothing to such cases. Therefore, I don't have to think about it, 
and if I don't publish an opinion I won't have to sift through a 
meaningless record to prove the frivolity of this appeal to an un-
caring public." We believe that judges zealously guard against such 
irresponsible decision making. But there is a danger of a judge de-
veloping a conditioned response to the surface characteristics of 
ut An equal protection challenge to the Seventh Circuit's limited publication practice 
was made in Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Council of Lawyers at 15-19, Browder v. 
Director, 434 U.S. 257 (1978). The Supreme Court's opinion in Browder, however, did not 
address that issue. 
110 That may partly explain the relatively high percentage of criminal appeals (44.9%) 
that are published. Many of those appeals are, no doubt, frivolous and in forma pauperis. 
Yet is is hard to uphold a conviction without some attempt at explanation, and once that 
attempt has been made there is an incentive to publish the fruits of the labor. 
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certain classes of recurrent and annoying litigation. Requiring a 
judge to justify a decision to the public is one way to minimize that 
danger.1111 
All of the circuits provide that oral argument need not be 
heard for some appeals. The idea is to expedite disposition and 
conserve judicial resources in cases where the issues are so plain 
that oral argument is most unlikely to add to the quality of deci-
sion making.1112 Because such "clean" cases are likely to result in 
routine dispositions without precedential impact, we should expect 
a substantial coincidence of nonpublication and denial of oral ar-
gument. In the survey year,. this hypothesis proved true. Only 32% 
of unpublished cases were argued orally, as compared to 81% of 
published cases.1118 
Although those figures are not surprising, they lend force to 
the concern that nonpublication reduces the incentive for judges to 
probe beyond the surface of the case. That concern is particularly 
acute in cases submitted for decision on the briefs, for oral argu-
ment may show a court that the case has depths not apparent from 
the paper record. Decision without argument, coupled with the 
prospect of nonpublication, removes two safeguards that might 
lead a court to notice that the case is not in fact "routine." 
Finally, there is the role played by central staff in the formula-
tion of opinions. Over the past decade, many courts, including the 
United States Courts of Appeals, have added large numbers of 
staff law clerks to assist in preparation for argument and later dis-
position.1114 The Ninth Circuit, for example; employed thirty staff 
clerks in 1978.11111 Although the use of staff clerks varies widely 
101 Judge Coffin addressed this point eloquently in his recent book: 
A remarkably effective device for detecting fissures in accuracy and logic is the reduc-
tion to writing of the results of one's thought processes .•.• Somehow, a decision 
mulled over in one's head or talked about in conference looks different when dressed 
up in written words and sent out into the sunlight .•.. [W)e may be in the very 
middle of an opinion, struggling to reflect the reasoning all judges have agreed on, only 
to realize that it simply "won't write." The act of writing tells us what was wrong with 
the act of thinking. 
F. COFFIN, THE: WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 57 
(1980). 
'"" APPELLATE JusTICE, supra note 2, at 2-32. 
150 STATISTICAL DATA, supra note 35, Tables 1P, 1U, 4P, 4U. 
,.. See generally D. MEADoR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF 
VoLUME (1974); Hellman, supra note 57; Lesinski & Stockmeyer, Prehearing Research and 
Screening in the Michigan Court of Appeals: One Court's Method for Increasing Judicial 
Productivity, 26 V AND. L. REv. 1211 (1973); Thompson, Mitigating the Damage-One 
Judge and No Judge Appellate Decisions, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 476 (1975). 
115 Hellman, supra note 57, at 946. 
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from court to court, in some the clerks are heavily involved in pre-
paring preargument memoranda and draft opinions. Such proce-
dures present an obvious danger of delegation of judicial responsi-
bility either to the presiding judge of a panel or to the staff itself, 
leading to what one state judge styled the "one judge" or "no 
judge" decision.1156 · 
That danger increases with the concentration of staff law 
clerks in areas of the law where the high volume of cases makes 
specialization possible-even desirable, given the possibility of 
economies of scale. Those high-volume areas, of course, are most 
likely to be the ones where frivolous appeals are the most com-
mon-criminal, prisoner, and social security cases, and appeals in 
forma pauperis. If, as seems likely, those cases frequently are de-
cided on submission, it can be seen how markedly the process by 
which many appeals are "heard" differs from the general percep-
tion of an appellate decision as based on a collegial exchange of 
views, marked by multiple drafts and developing ideas.1157 
That ideal may not often be attained. In fact, when the cumu-
lative impact of limited publication, central staff, and the associ-
ated phenomena is assessed, it can be seen that the courts of ap-
peals often behave much like courts with discretionary 
jurisdiction-like certiorari courts, in short. Suppose a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus is denied by a lower court. The case is 
reviewed by a staff member, who makes recommendations and 
submits draft opinions. It is disposed of without argument by the 
court. That process could equally well describe a denial of certio-
rari by the Supreme Court or the disposition of a "routine" case by 
a circuit court. They certainly cannot be distinguished on the 
ground that denials of certiorari are unpublished and non-
precedential; so are most such "routine" circuit court decisions. A 
plausible distinction is that denials of certiorari typically are not 
accompanied by a statement of reasons, but our findings show that 
many of the circuit courts' unpublished opinions are similarly be-
reft of justification. A formal difference exists, of course, in that 
discretionary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court has been author-
ized by Congress, 1158 while the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit 
courts is mandatory.11511 But when washed in the "cynical acid,"160 
1
" Thompson, supra note 154. 
m The best description of the ideal process is Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 
73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959). 
... 28 u.s.c. § 1254 (1976). 
11
' Id. § 1291. 
180 Holmes, supra note 6, at 462. 
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this formal difference evaporates. For the realist, the processes are 
the same. The conclusion is inescapable that, with regard to a large 
part of their caseload, the circuit courts have transformed them-
selves, contrary to congressional mandate, into certiorari courts. 
Perhaps such a transformation is the necessary result of an 
overwhelming caseload. It may be that little has been lost, and that 
the quality of justice has not been diminished appreciably. Cer-
tainly some such steps are necessary to allow the continued opera-
tion of the system. Yet the cost of a changed appellate process 
must be recognized for what it is in order that the final price of 
judicial overload can be fully reckoned. 
V. CoNcLUSION 
A. A Model Rule 
Our survey of the publication habits of the circuit courts con-
firms that the principal benefit of limited publication is swifter jus-
tice; in addition, there may be savings in judicial efforts that in 
turn may be translated into gains in productivity. We have also 
identified two major costs: suppressed precedent and, more seri-
ously, a marked number of low-quality opinions. Those findings 
challenge the critic to fashion a rule that maximizes the benefits of 
limited publication while avoiding as many of its costs as possible. 
The Model Rule that follows attempts to meet that challenge. 
Rule -· Opinions.161 
1. Minimum Standards:182 
Every decision will be accompanied by an opinion that suffi-
ciently states the facts of the case, its procedural stance and his-
tory, and the relevant legal authority so that the basis for the dis-
181 We first proposed a Model Rule for publication in Limited Publication, supra note 
4, at 837-40. The version in the text reflects lessons learned in the present study. 
The Model Rule does not mention the noncitation corollary to limited publication be-
cause this study did not include any findings relative to citation. We have briefly summa-
rized our view of noncitation rules in text and notes at notes 28-33 supra. For a more de-
tailed analysis of noncitation rules, see Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1194-
99. Similarly, this study did not focus on the circulation of unpublished opinions, so the 
Model Rule does not address the problem. Our views on circulation are expressed in Lim-
ited Publication, supra note 4, at 813-14. 
182 Inclusion of a section on minimum standards was designed to focus judicial atten-
tion on the need to provide a minimally satisfactory explanation of why the court reached a 
given result. 
HeinOnline -- 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 627 1981
1981] Limited Publication 627 
position can be understood from the opinion and the authority 
cited. 
If the decision is based on the opinion below, sufficient por-
tions of that opinion should be incorporated into the opinion of 
this court so that the basis for this court's disposition can be un-
derstood from a reading of this court's opinion. 
2. Publication of Opinions: 
a. Criteria for Publication: An opinion will be published if it: 
(1) establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an ex-
isting rule of law, or calls attention to an existing rule of law 
that appears to have been generally overlooked;168 
(2) applies an established rule of law to facts significantly 
different from those in previous applications of the rule;164 
(3) explains, criticizes, or reviews the history, application, or 
administration of existing decisional or enacted law;1615 
( 4) creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within 
the circuit or between this circuit and another;166 
(5) concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of significant 
public interest;167 
(6) is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion; 
(7) reverses the decision below, unless: 
a) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in 
law or fact, or 
b) the reversal is a remand (without further comment) 
to the district court of a case reversed or remanded by 
the Supreme Court;168 
tu The first clause of this rule was included in the guidelines for opinion publication 
suggested by the Federal Judicial Center. See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 15. It was in-
cluded in some form in several circuit plans. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. 
a; 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(i); 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(l)(i); 8TH CIR. R. app. 11 4(a); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(l). 
The last clause, the resurrection rule, seems to be the unique property of the Ninth Circuit. 
9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(2). 
1 
.. See DISTRICT oF CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. e; 8TH CIR. R. app. 11 4(c). 
180 See DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. c; 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(iii); 7TH CIR. R. 
35(c)(l)(iii); 9TH CIR. R. 2l(b)(3). 
118 See DISTRICT oF CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. d; 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(v); 7TH CIR. R. 
35(c)(l)(iv)(C); 8TH CIR. R. app. 11 4(b), (f); lOTH Cm. R. 17(d)(l). 
111 See DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CIRcUIT PLAN para. b; 4TH Cm. R. 18(a)(ii); 7TH CIR. R. 
35(c)(l)(ii); 8TH CIR. R. app. 11 4(d); 9TH Cm. R. 21(b)(4). 
118 Elsewhere we recommended the publication of all reversals. See Limited Publica-
tion, supra note 4, at 839. Here we withdraw that recommendation because it would unnec-
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(8) addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision 
that has been published;169 or 
(9) is an opinion in a disposition that 
a) has been reviewed by the United States Supreme 
Court, or 
b) is a remand of a case from the United States Su-
preme Court.170 
b. Publication Decision: There shall be a presumption in 
favor of publication. An opinion shall be published unless each 
member of the panel deciding the case determines that it fails to 
meet the criteria for publication. 
3. The court recognizes that the decision of a case without 
oral argument and without publication is a substantial abbrevia-
tion of the traditional appellate process and will employ both de-
vices in a single case only when the appeal is patently frivolous. 
Many of the provisions of the Model Rule were suggested by 
existing circuit court rules. We provide textual discussion only of 
those provisions that were suggested primarily by the empirical 
study. 
The most striking finding of the study is the extremely high 
cost of nonpublication in terms of opinion quality. Nine of the 
eleven circuits produced twenty percent or more below-standard 
opinions. In six circuits the figure was above thirty percent.171 Sec-
tion 1 of the Model Rule should remedy that situation. The need 
for the provision is all the more apparent given that opinion quali-
ty is not correlated with productivity.172 In other words, by adopt-
ing section 1, the courts could remedy the most serious drawback 
of nonpublication-poor opinion quality-without reducing pro-
ductivity. The case for the provision thus is very strong. 
essarily increase the courts' published opinion totals by including pass-throughs and other 
opinions of limited precedential value. 
180 See 4TH Cm. R. 18(a)(vi); SIXTH CIRCUIT PLAN 111; 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(1)(v); 8TH CIR. 
R. app. 11 4(e); 9TH Cm. R. 21(b)(5). 
170 A case that has generated a full United States Supreme Court opinion clearly should 
be published at the circuit court level-even if the publication order is retroactive. A circuit 
court opinion following a remand from the Supreme Court also should be published. How-
ever, if the opinion is simply a reference back to the district court, there is no need for 
publication. 
171 See Table 10 supra. 
172 See Table 11 supra. 
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Section 2 of the Model Rule includes detailed publication cri-
teria. Six of the eleven circuits currently use such detailed crite-
ria.178 Our findings showed no positive correlation between specific-
ity of publication criteria and the percentage of opinions 
published. 174 Nevertheless, we favor specific criteria on the theory 
that the publication decision will be made in a more intelligent and 
consistent manner if the judges have detailed criteria to guide 
them. The result should be fewer cases of suppressed precedent. 
Additionally, our figures do not disprove the effect of specificity on 
publication percentages; they simply fail to prove it. 
Three of the criteria warrant individual discussion. Section 
2(a)(3) tries to ensure publication of opinions that reflect problems 
in the administration of justice or the working of case or statutory 
law. Judges are in a unique position to observe such problems. Any 
opinions that result from that advantage should be made generally 
available. 
Section 2(a)(6) of the Model Rule calls for publication of all 
opinions that are accompanied by concurring or dissenting opin-
ions. The results of the study provide strong evidence that such 
opinions are likely to deserve public dissemination. Of the four 
such opinions that we evaluated, only two were correctly left un-
published.176 Furthermore, the cost of such a provision is negligi-
ble. In the entire survey year, only thirty-eight such opinions went 
unpublished-about 0.5% of the total of unpublished opinions.176 
This balance of costs and benefits strongly supports section 
2(a)(6). 
The situation is not so clear with regard to section 
2(a)(7)-publication of reversals. Our findings indicate that many 
unpublished reversals should have been published. Some were law-
declaring opinions and others revealed important information 
about the performance of lower courts and administrative agencies. 
On the other hand, some reversals, for instance those caused sim-
ply by an intervening change in the facts or law, should not have 
been published. An addition to the equation is the high cost of 
publishing all reversals. In the survey year, such a move would 
have increased the total of published opinions by twenty per-
17
• See Table 3 supra. 
174 See text and notes at notes 48-50 supra. 
171 See text and notes at notes 116-131 supra. 
171 See text at note 131 supra. 
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· cent.177 Accordingly, section 2(a)(7) is a compromise that attempts 
to secure the publication of only those reversals that are likely to 
be significant. 
Section 2(b) of the Model Rule calls for a presumption in 
favor of publication. Our results indicate that such a presumption 
is likely to affect actual publication behavior, because circuits with 
a presumption against publication actually did publish less than 
circuits without such a presumption.178 Increased publication is 
likely to diminish the problems of suppressed precedent and poor 
opinion quality. Although there may be some loss in the area of 
swifter justice, our results do not suggest that productivity is likely 
to suffer.179 Section 2(b) also requires a unanimous decision of the 
panel in order not to publish. 
The language of Section 3 is entirely precatory. It simply calls 
for judges to recognize the dangers inherent in combining several 
judicial "shortcuts" in a single case. There is some temptation to 
call for publication in all cases in which there is no oral argument 
or vice-versa, but the cost of such a provision is high. In the survey 
year, it would have more than doubled the total of published opin-
ions.180 Our hope is that the precatory language of Section 3 will 
call the judges' attention to the possibility that they may be trans-
forming their courts, without statutory authority, into certiorari 
courts. 
B. Summing Up 
The discussion of limited publication has produced numerous 
claims concerning the harms and benefits of the practice. This 
study permits an empirical evaluation of many of these claims. It is 
clear that limited publication produces at least one significant ben-
efit-swifter appellate justice. The claimed benefit of savings of ju-
dicial time and effort is less clear. It is difficult to read many un-
published opinions without concluding that relatively little time 
and effort was spent in their production. Yet we found no positive 
correlation between a circuit's tendency not to publish and its pro-
177 The number of published opinions for the survey year in all circuits was 4699. See 
Table 1 supra. There were 1018 unpublished nonaffirmances. See Table 13 supra. 
178 See text and notes at notes 51-53 supra. 
170 See text and note at note 65 supra. 
180 If the 78% of all unpublished opinions decided without oral argument, see text and 
note at note 153 supra, had been published, the number of published opinions would have 
shot up from 4699 to 10,721. See Table 1 supra. 
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ductivity. Other variables may obscure the relationship between 
nonpublication and productivity. Alternatively, the judges may be 
using the time saved to perform important but not case-related 
functions. Although we suspect that the time-savings hypothesis is 
true, we are unable to verify it empirically. 
Our examination of the circuits' work has provided little to 
justify major concern about the problem of suppressed precedent. 
We did, however, find a number of cases where valuable discus-
sions of difficulties with the law or its administration were sub-
merged. The circuit courts could substantially remedy the problem 
by adhering to several of the provisions of our Model Rule. 
The more significant drawback to the system is its pernicious 
effect on judicial responsibility. In many circuits, large percentages 
of the unpublished opinions failed to satisfy even minimum stan-
dards. Further, when nonpublication is combined with denial of 
oral argument, the result may curtail the appellate process in a 
way inconsistent with the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the 
courts of appeals. Once again the Model Rule provides a way to 
reduce those costs substantially. 
Perhaps the greatest danger of any procedural reform is that it 
will be adopted without sufficient reflection or continued without 
sufficient study. Although the publication plans received ample 
thought before their adoption and during their first several years 
of operation, study of the effects of the plans has almost entirely 
ceased. From 1973 until 1977, the plans were the subject of annual 
reports by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to 
the Judicial Conference of the United States. The reports are no 
longer being made; since 1977 the study of the plans has come 
largely from outside of the judicial system. Clearly the courts 
themselves have no facilities to conduct such inquiries. The proper 
agency is the Administrative Office. Data on the workings of the 
publication plans (and other recent appellate court reforms) 
should be included as a regular part of the Annual Report. Perhaps 
after several years of such reporting, more ambitious statistical 
studies will be possible and will provide more conclusive answers 
to the questions arising out of the limited publication debate. 
